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ABSTRACT
In recent times, there has been a proliferation of laws
enacted by individual states and townships which restrict the
ability of mariners to anchor within navigable waters of the
united states. These laws have been enacted in many of the
coastal states, but are most prevalent in California, Florida
and Hawaii. Uncertainty as to whether anchoring is an act of
navigation, thereby being a constitutional right, has resulted
in confusion among boaters, legal authorities and policy
makers. In an attempt to clarify the uncertainty surrounding
this issue, a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
anchoring laws within the state of Hawaii has come before the
public eye. Although the Hawaiian lawsuit is focused solely
upon anchoring laws which affect that state, the ultimate
outcome of the case could set precedent for this issue on a
national basis.
As case history has been unhelpfully silent in the
resolution of the anchoring issue, primary legal doctrines,
such as the united states Constitution, the pubI ic trust
doctrine and legal traditions practiced since the Institutes
of Justinian law must provide some of the essential
guidelines. Also of importance are the opinions of federal
agencies, such as the Coast Guard, and Army Corps of
engineers.
The following study addresses the current state of the
ii
anchoring conflict, explains the importance of a solution,
examines the documents which affect the issue, and proposes
conclusions based on logic, history, and the guidelines set
forth in the surveyed primary data. The conclusions support
the proposals that anchoring can be proven to be an act of
navigation, laws which restrict anchoring likewise restrict
constitutional rights, and that anchoring laws may be deemed
to be unconstitutional.
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CHAPl'ER I: THE ANCHORING CONFLICT
A. Intoduction
Across the nation, the headlines resound: "Anchoring
Rights Topic of Conference"l, "N.Y. Boaters Form Rights Group
In Response To Anchoring Limits,,2, "Mooring Ordinance
Challenged,,3, "Anchoring Rules coming,,4, and "Hawaii suit
Aims To Block Tough New Anchorage Law". 5 The headlines
address problems which have emerged from a recent
proliferation of state-imposed anchorage laws.
A number of coastal states have recently enacted laws
which restrict free anchoring in navigable waters of the
United States. 6 Uncertainty as to whether anchoring is a
constitutional right has resulted in confusion among boaters,
legal authorities and policy makers. As a result, conflicts
have occurred and the constitutionality of laws which impose
1 Soundings, December, 1992.
2 Soundings, June, 1993.
3 Sarasota Herald-Tribune, September 17, 1990.
4 Soundings, December, 1992.
5 Soundings, January, 1993.
6 Jim Flannery, "Anchoring Rules Coming", soundings,
December, 1992.
1
restrictions on free anchoring has been questioned. 7
Anchoring laws often originate through state legislation
which has been established either to regulate environmental
resources, or delineate state power over waters and
navigation. 8 state legislation over marine resources is
established through the SUbmerged Lands Act of 1953. 9 The Act
grants paramount authority to the state, with the exception
that the federal government retains its navigation
servitude,10 for the "constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation, national defense and international affairs. ,,11
At this juncture, it is important to distinguish between
two maritime terms Which, because of their similarities, may
be a potential source of confusion during SUbsequent stages of
the analysis. In particular, these terms are "anchoring" and
"mooring". "Anchoring" entails the use of an anchor or similar
weight to prevent a vessel from moving significantly over an
7 Flannery, "Hawaii suit to block tough new anchorage
law", Soundings, January, 1993. The case in question,
Hawaiian Navigable waters Preservation Society v. State of
Hawaii 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993), challenges the
constitutionality of Hawaiian anchorage laws.
8 Id. at 53.
9 SUbmerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C., Sec. 1314 et. seq.
10 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 147. The
navigation servitude is the paramount right of the federal
government, under the Commerce Clause of the u.S.
Constitution to compel the removal of any obstruction to
navigation.
11 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C., Sec. 1314.
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area of submerged land to which the vessel is affixed by means
of such anchor, weight, chain and length of rope. The anchor,
or weight is typically carried aboard such vessel when the
vessel is not anchored.
"Mooring" entails the act of securing a vessel over an
area of sUbmerged land by means of affixing such vessel to an
anchor or weight which is permanently, or semi-permanently
located on such submerged land. This anchor, or weight is
refered to as a "mooring". Moorings are typically installed
and maintained by individuals or state agencies which have
been granted permits to install and collect revenues from such
moorings. The following research is concerned solely with
state-imposed laws which place restrictions on anchoring.
The constitutionality of state-imposed regulations and
restrictions on anchoring was recently challenged in a class
action suit initiated by a boater interest group against the
state of Hawaii. 12 The case, Hawaiian Navigable Waters
Preservation Society v. state of Hawaii, (HNWPS v. Hawaii),
was heard before the U. S. District Court for the State of
Hawaii on March 5, 1993. The court upheld the authority of the
state in imposing restrictions on anchoring. 13 Shortly after
the District Court decision, the plaintiffs filed for an
appeal, and although a hearing date has not yet been
12 Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Society v.
state of Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993).
13 Id.
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determined, the case will be heard in the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals, in San Francisco, California .14 This case is the
only one to date in which the constitutionality of anchoring
laws has been, and continues to be challenged.
There are various statutes, legal doctrines and legal
opinions which constitute the primary guidelines along which
the question of jurisdiction (and hence the constitutionality)
of anchoring laws may be resolved. 15 These include the
Submerged Lands Act, the navigation servitude, the pubLi.c
trust doctrine,16 and a legal opinion submitted by the Coast
Guard on matters concerning federal versus state regulation of
anchoring. 17
The SUbmerged Lands Act provides the basis upon which
states have enacted laws which regulate anchoring. States are
limited in their authority by federal preemption in regulating
matters concerning navigation, as established in the
navigation servitude. If state regulations do not trespass
14 HNWPS v. Hawaii, civil Docket, u.S. District Court
For the District of Hawaii, Nov 4, 1993: 8.
15 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. SUpp. 766; 1993. Some of the
sources examined by the District Court include the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, the Commerce Clause, the January, 1993
Coast Guard legal opinion, various Hawaiian session Laws,
the Equal Protection Clause, and various legal cases.
16 Mark Amaral and Virginia Lee, Public Rights to
Coastal Waters: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine, Rhode
Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1992: xxi. Traditional
rights enjoyed by the pUblic within pUblic trust areas are
those of fishing, fOWling, navigation and recreation.
17 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. State
RegUlation", Dec. 30, 1992.
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within the boundaries of the federal navigation servitude,
then such state regulations may be permissible. However, if
anchoring is an act associated with navigation, then laws
which regulate anchoring may be sUbject to federal preemption.
In January, 1993, the Commandant's office of the Coast
Guard released a legal opinion in which it addressed its
position with regard to federal versus state regUlation of
anchoring. The Coast Guard took the position that it had joint
jurisdiction with the states over navigable waters. The
validity of the Coast Guard opinion has recently been
questioned, as evidenced by the fact that Rep. Gerry Studds,
Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
has ordered a congressional review of the document. 18 There
is sUbstantial evidence indicating that it may be the Army
Corps of Engineers that is responsible for monitoring some
matters which affect navigation. 19
The Public Trust Doctrine reserves certain constitutional
rights for the general pUblic. Historically, the common law
rights of the public in public trust lands and waters are
18 Id. Also telephone interview with Joan Bondareff,
Coast Guard Group, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Washington, D.C., (202) 226-3500, March 30, 1994.
Bondareff indicated that the congressional review has not
yet occurred and that no date has been set for such review.
19 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 171. Congress,
through various acts, has granted to the Secretary of the
Army the powers to maintain the navigability of the waters
of the United States. In turn, the Secretary of the Army has
delegated that responsibility to the Corps.
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related to "commerce, fishing recreation and navigation.,,20
Each state holds a public trust interest in its areas which
are deemed as being navigable. 21 Thus, it is the
responsibility of the state to assure the pUblic of its rights
to the same areas. If a law which is enacted by a state
impinges upon established pUblic trust rights, such as
navigation and recreation, such a law may be deemed
~nconstitutional.
As yet, no legal precedent has been established to define
the parameters of anchoring laws in association with the
federal navigation servitude or the public rights of
navigation and recreation. Likewise, the question of whether
regulatory authority should fall into state or federal hands
has not been clearly answered. Only after these questions have
been addressed shall it be possible to determine whether
anchoring laws are permissible state activities, or in fact
unconstitutional encroachments on federal and pUblic rights.
20 Mark Amaral and Virginia Lee, Public Rights to
Coastal Waters, "Applying the Public Trust Doctrine", Rhode
Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1992: xxi.
21 Id.
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B. Scope of the Problem
As the proliferation of anchoring laws continues, there
has been a considerable backlash in the form. of a negative
response to such laws among the boating community. This has
resulted in the establishment of boater-rights-oriented
activist groups, informative publications22, legal
confrontations, legal defense groups, and an outpouring of
editorials and official statements challenging the
constitutionality of such laws.
The extent to which some activist groups have expressed
dissatisfaction with anchorage laws may be seen in the
following excerpt from an editorial written by Edwin Hager,
founder of Boater Rights, a group based in Bradenton, Florida:
With complete disregard for state and Federal laws ... the
Longboat Key Town Commission is once again trying to
rewrite both state and Federal law. [A] Proposed
ordinance [regulating] Anchored Vessels and Liveaboards
is nothing more than another unconstitutional attempt to
take away the rights of the public....My ancestors died
in bloody wars to defend the Constitution and the freedom
that we claim as citizens of the United states. How can
I accept these freedoms without the same conviction?23
22 One example of an "informative pUblication" is Harry
Phillips' Your Right To Anchor, Analemma House, Lake Park,
Fla. 1988. The pUblication takes a quasi-legal approach
towards constitutional factors involved in anchoring rights.
23 Edwin Hager, Editorial sent to and subsequently
printed in The Longboat Observer, Aug. 23, 1990.
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The almost militant style with which Hager expresses his
conviction against laws which may impinge upon constitutional
rights is likewise reflected in a periodical distributed by
the Sailors Total Anchoring Rights Society (STARS):
...AII boaters have the right to use our federal waters
system without the harassment of the local police and
without the invalid ordinances that are being written to
usurp these rights. The only way we are going to gain
these rights is to SUE THE BASTARDS! ... We are going to
find each ordinance that is attempting to limit the
rights of boaters to anchor and otherwise use our federal
waters~ and we are going to file suit in ... a federal
court. 4
While boater interest groups have expressed a
considerable amount of sentiment against state-imposed laws
restricting anchoring, riparian land owners have expressed
opinions commensurate in fervor with those of the boaters, yet
in the opposite extreme. Although research has not indicated
the existence of any riparian land owner interest groups, some
of the opinions of this obviously interested group may be
taken into account, again, through pUblished editorials. The
following excerpt is indicative of one riparian land owner's
point of view:
[With regard to anchoring laws] ... I can see a 24-hour
limit on anchoring in some areas and pretty much a
maximum of 72 hours in other less populated places. Here
in Florida we've all seen some rather scruffy live
aboard-on-the-cheap types that you would not want
24 Harry Phillips, STARS, Winter, 1989, Vol. 1 No. IV:
2-3.
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anchored in your backyard. 25
This point of view is echoed in the following excerpt from a
letter which appeared in the same pUblication:
I, for one, think that tougher laws are required for
anchoring especially in southeast Florida due to the
crack-pot mentality of these sailboat owners. If the
local municipalities let these people have their way, no
one would be able to navigate the ICW [Intracoastal
Waterway] without running into an illegally anchored
sailboat .... I will continue to push for stronger laws to
prohibit all overnight anchoring in the ICW and maybe the
outright banning of all sailboats. 26
As it can be seen, a radical difference exists between
the points of view of both boater-rights interest groups and
riparian land owners. While both parties may be seen as
expressing their views in the extreme, these views are
ultimately heard by local, state and federal legislators, and
playa major role in the subsequent establishment of laws. It
is the obligation of the state, through the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA), "to preserve, protect, develop, and
where possible, to restore or enhance the resources of the
nation's coastal zone ... ,,27 Typically, this is accomplished
through proper coastal zone management. In theory, proper
coastal zone management assures that all pUblic and private
25 Resident of EI Jobean, Fla., Boat U.S. Reports, Vol.
XXVIII, May, 1993: 6.
26 Id.
27 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. Sec.
303: 1.
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interests are taken into account while examining issues
relative to the coastal zone. Ultimately, the goal of
lawmakers involved in coastal zone management is to strike a
balance, wherein all parties involved may be appeased.
Unfortunately, as is often the case, the affected parties may
not always be completely satisfied with the decisions of the
lawmakers.
While both state and local authorities have typically
assumed active roles in coastal zone management and the
anchoring conflict, the involvement of Federal agencies has
typically been characterized as one of detached observation.
This is evidenced in part by Executive Order 12612 of 26,
October, 1987. 28 This order on "federalism" mandates that
all Federal agencies are to avoid the assertion of preemption
of state and local government action. Under this Order,
Federal agencies may commence preemption claims only where a
Federal statute contains an express preemption provision or
where there is clear evidence that Congress intended to so
preempt. 29
As of yet, the only Federal agency which has been
continually involved in the anchoring issue has been the U.S.
Coast Guard. Although the Coast Guard has been involved to the
extent of following up on correspondence and issuing legal
opinions, it has still taken more of a passive, rather than
28 Executive Order #12612, "Federalism", Oct. 26, 1987.
29 rd.
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active role in conflict resolution. This may be seen in the
following Coast Guard statements:
[In reference to direct Coast Guard intervention in the
anchoring conflict] The Coast Guard's long-standing
policy not to assume a legal position when a state
proposes to regulate, restrict, or prohibit navigation
except in situations that lead to direct conflict with
Federal laws and regulations administered and enforced by
the Coast Guard will continue. 3 0
... It is more appropriate for issues such as whether the
state action [in regulating anchoring] is prohibited by
the supremacy clause of the constitution to be resolved
by the courts or through state political processes
[rather than through Coast Guard intervention].31
As it can be seen, the ongoing conflict concerning laws
which impose restrictions on anchoring in the navigable waters
of the United states is one which has been characterized by
multiple, oftentimes divergent points of view. It has also
been punctuated by both legal challenges and opinions. The
crux of the anchoring conflict ultimately lies in the relation
of anchoring to navigation. Once a definition of anchoring in
relation to navigation is legally established, a significant
milestone will have been reached in the struggle to resolve
anchoring conflicts.
30 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 3.
31 Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District, Memorandum
#16636, serial: 0874, June, 1991.
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c. Advantages of Resolution
The anchoring conflict has been selected as the sUbject
of this study for two reasons: its relevance to the field of
marine affairs and its current development as a controversial
issue in constitutional law . within the scope of marine
affairs, anchoring laws fall into the more specific category
of coastal zone management. Interests in the coastal zone are
both wide and varied, so that the intrinsic nature of coastal
zone management is to provide some sort of balance in
attempting to meet these needs. Needless to say, existing
legislation does not always completely meet every
constituent's needs, and the result often takes the form of
conflicts such as those Which currently exist between boater
groups and the state of Hawaii. In this respect, coastal zone
management may be the most effective means by which to resolve
these differences.
One of the elements of the study is a focus on a
currently developing case involving a challenge to the
constitutionality of existing laws. As these laws deal with
marine-related issues, the outcome will be of major
significance to both the fields of maritime and constitutional
law. Ultimately this study may aid in the compilation of data
which could prove to be helpful in the resolution of such
issues.
12
The first objective of this study is to provide a
comprehensive review of the anchoring conflict and establish
its relationship with the Submerged Lands Act, the Commerce
Clause (navigation servitude) and the Public Trust Doctrine.
The second objective is to clarify the question of Coast Guard
vs. Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction over anchoring
issues. This will be accomplished subsequent to the third
Objective, which is to both clarify and substantiate the
definition of navigation and, more specifically, to consider
how anchoring may be associated with such a definition. The
final objective is to provide an opinion, based on a review of
available precedents, as to whether anchoring regulations
should Ultimately be upheld as a state matter, or be deemed to
be an unconstitutional restriction on pUblic rights or
interstate commerce.
The national focus is on HNWPS v. Hawaii, thereby making
it the case from which evaluation and judgement applicable to
other states shall be derived. Conclusions within the study
will be drawn independent of the outcome of the case; a legal
question of such magnitude could remain in the courts for
years, and it is the researcher's intent to forecast, rather
than report on possible outcomes. The study will describe the
current state of anchorage laws and the conflicts which have
arisen since their establishment. The study shall go on to
explain why conflicts exist, and how existing federal
legislation has resulted in confusion as to whether anchoring
13
is a pUblic right or a compensatory privilege. Ultimately, the
compilation of data within the research will enable the
researcher to accurately judge who should have authority to
regulate anchoring: the states, or the federal government.
14
D. statement of Hypotheses
In order to support the research, the following
hypotheses will be tested:
1. Anchoring can be proven to be an act of navigation.
2. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in HNWPS
v. Hawaii unnecessarily restrict interstate commerce.
3. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in HNWPS
v. Hawaii unnecessarily restrict public rights associated with
the pUblic trust doctrine.
4. state-imposed anchorage laws which unnecessarily restrict
interstate commerce or publ.I.c trust rights will be deemed
unconstitutional.
15
D. Anchoring as an Act of Navigation
One of the issues lying at the heart of the anchoring
conflict has to do with the definition of 'navigation', and
more specifically, the relationship of anchoring to that
definition. It has already been established that free
navigation is ensured under federal protection. The federal
navigation servitude, the offspring of the commerce clause
within the United states Constitution,32 gives paramount
right to the federal government to compel the removal of any
obstruction to navigation. 33 The navigation servitude is
SUbsequently codified through the Submerged Lands Act of
1953. 34 The Act, though granting jurisdictional use of said
lands to the individual states, provides that:
The United states retains all of its navigation servitude
and rights in and powers of regulation and control of
said lands for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation, national defense and international
ff . 35a alrs ....
Although it has already been established that navigation
is an activity associated with public trust rights, anchoring
32 The Constitution of the United States, Article 1,
section 8, Sept. 17, 1787.
33 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law: 147.
34 Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43, U.S.C. Sec. 1301
et.seq.
35 Id. at 1314 (a).
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as a right under the pUblic trust doctrine may be
substantially reinforced by its association with navigation,
a more traditional public trust right. Traditional rights
enjoyed by the public in pubLi.c trust areas are those of
"fishing, fowling, navigation and recreation".36
Navigation is a federally protected constitutional right.
This is affirmed through the navigation servitude, the
submerged Lands Act, and the pUblic trust doctrine. Hence, it
would follow that any statute acting as a means of hindering
or placing unnecessary burdens on free navigation would be in
violation of said provisions. Likewise, if anchoring is an act
of navigation, statutes which hinder or place unnecessary
burdens on free anchoring would also be in violation of said
provisions. It is the purpose of the following section to
clarify the legal definition of navigation and resolve the
question of whether or not anchoring is an act encompassed
within the definition of navigation.
'Navigate' as defined in Webster's New International
Dictionary, 2nd. edition, includes the following:
L. navigatus, past part. of navigare, v.t.&i., fro navis
ship k agers to move, direct ... ) Intransitive: 1. To
journey by water; to go in a vessel; to sailor navigate
a vessel; to use the waters as a highway for commerce, or
communication; ply ... 2. Hence, to direct one's course
through any medium; to steer, especially to operate an
airplane or airship. Transitive: 1. to pass over in
36 Amaral and Lee, Public Rights To Coastal Waters:
Applying The Public Trust Doctrine, Rhode Island, Coastal
Resources Center, 1992: xxi.
17
vessels; to sail over or on; as, to navigate the
Atlantic;--said also of vessels; by extension, to direct
one's course through (any medium). 2. to steer direct or
manage in sailing; to conduct; hence to operate, steer,
control the course of (an airplane or airship).
It should be duly noted that nowhere in the preceding
definition is there any mention of 'anchor' or 'anchoring' as
an act of navigation. This is of no consequence, as courts
have, in the past, refused to rely on the "definition of such
a non-maritime pUblication" to define the parameters of
navigation. 37 Instead, courts have looked towards previous
case history and documents to supplement the definition of
navigation.
One of the earliest instances in which a court of the
United states attempted to define the meaning of 'navigation',
and what maritime activities are encompassed within the term,
occurred in 1838 with the case of Bowen v. Hope. 38 In this
case, the court addressed the question of whether a ship was
'at sea' at the time when her insurance policy had expired.
The vessel had been insured for a year, and if 'at sea' when
the year expired, then the coverage of her policy was to
continue until her return to port. 39 Before the expiration
of the year, the vessel had been made ready for sea, and left
the port of Bangor, Wales, destined for Boston. After sailing
a distance of seven or eight miles, she encountered head winds
37 United states v. Monstad, 134 F.2d 986 (1943): 8.
38 Bowen v. Hope, 37 Mass. 275 (1838).
39 Id. at 2.
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and was unable to get out of the straits of Menai. There she
came to anchor, and although attempting to leave for several
days, was unable to do so. When she was finally able to make
. h d . d 40way, the year's 1nsurance coverage a exp1re.
Upon arrival in Boston, the insurer made the contention
that the vessel had not been covered during the voyage as she
had been anchored at the time when her insurance had
expired. 41 The court held that even though the vessel had
been anchored, she was actively engaged in navigation, and
that she was consequently 'at sea' within the meaning of her
insurance policy.42
The definition of 'navigation' was further expanded in
the case of The Idaho, in 1886. 4 3 At issue here was the
transportation of a greater number of passengers by a
steamship (the Idaho), than was permissible under the vessel's
certificate of inspection. Upon returning to port in Townsend,
Washington Territory, the vessel was seized and held liable to
fines under United states statutes. 44
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 3.
43 The Idaho, 29 F. 187, (1886).
44 section 4499 of the United states Revised statutes
reads: "If any vessel, propelled in whole or in part by
steam, be navigated without complying with the terms of this
title, the owner shall be liable to the United States ... in a
penalty of $500.00 for each offense .... lt shall not be
lawful to take on board any steamer a greater number of
passengers than is stated in the certificate of
19
In defending their position, the owners of the vessel
contended that navigation did not include taking on
passengers, and hence, the court had no jurisdiction to
enforce the penalty. In responding to this contention, the
court stated its opinion as to what was included within the
scope of 'navigation':
The navigation of a vessel, within the purview of this
section, includes ... everything required and provided
therefor and thereabout in this title ... such as
equipment, management, the character and stowage of
cargo, and the number and treatment of passengers
thereon. 45
Thus, early definitions of 'navigation' did not limit it
simply to the passage of vessels between ports, but included
acts incidental to making a journey. Taking on passengers,
stowing their luggage or cargo, managing a vessel, and
anchoring where need dictates were all held to be acts of
navigation. SUbsequently, courts have held that navigation is
not limited to the movement of a vessel upon waters, but also
includes actions which are necessary to effectuate the passage
of vessels upon waters.
In Locke v. state,46 at issue was the collection of
reprisals by the widow of a mariner. The mariner sustained
injuries as the result of a negligent state employee, while
his boat was in a canal. The state employee had let down a
inspection ... " Id. at 5.
45 Id at 11.
46 Locke v. State, 140 N.Y.S. 480, 75 N.E. 1076,
(1894) .
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lift bridge on the mariner's boat, thus causing the
injuries. 47 The question was whether the injuries resulted
from the 'navigation of the canals', in which case the widow
would be granted the reprisal.
Here, the court found that, although the vessel was not
moving under its own power at the time of the accident, it was
nonetheless engaged in navigating the canals. The court stated
that:
The act of navigating fairly includes the passage of
vessels through locks, through canals, or under draw or
lift-bridges ... if any injury shall occur while passing
through a lock, through the neglect of the agent or
servant of the state ... such injury would in a just sense
result from the navigation of the canals. The man who
operates the locks and bridges in order to permit the
passage of boats upon the canal is engaged in navigating
the canal. 48
Thus, the meaning of 'navigation' was expanded to include
not only the movement of a vessel upon waters, but the actions
of people not even on the vessel, affecting the vessel's
movement and safety.
In Sayer v. State,49 the court found that a vessel need
not be in motion, nor be attended in order to qualify as being
'in navigation'. At issue here was the collision of a state-
owned vessel into a privately owned motorboat moored at a
slip. The collision resulted in the loss of the motorboat, the
47 Id.
48 Id. at 5.
49 Sayer v. State, 190 N.Y.S. 359, (1921).
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owner of which subsequently filed for relief from the state
for damages. As in the previous case, the cOllision occurred
near a system of canals, however here laws did not provide for
claims arising out of "navigation of the canals".50
In dismissing the case, the court found that although the
private vessel had been moored at a slip, it was nonetheless
engaged in navigation. The court stated that:
The fact that the boat was not in motion is not
conclusive on the question. It has been held that the
word 'navigation' for some purposes includes a period
when a ship is not in motion, as for instance when she is
at anchor •.•. The motor boat, moored at the terminal, thus
was engaged in navigation ..• althou~h at the moment [of
collision] she was not in motion. 5 T
Perhaps one of the best incorporations of anchoring
within the definition of navigation is derived from united
states v. Monstad. 52 Here, a vessel which had been anchored
for over two years was held to be lin navigation,.53 In this
case, action was brought by the United states against Jesse
Monstad, the owner of the fishing barge Kohala, to recover a
50 section 47 of the New York state Canal Laws (N.Y.S.
Consolo Laws, c. 5) provides that: "any person sustaining
damages from the canals or their ose, or from neglect of
conduct of any officers having charge of the same, or
resulting from any accident connected with the canals, may
recover under the conditions herein prescribed, such an
amount as will properly compensate him therefor .•. provided
that the provisions of this section shall not extend to
claims arising from damages resulting from the navigation of
the canals." Id. at 2-3, quoting New York state Canal Laws.
51 Id. at 4.
52 united states v. Monstad, 134 F.2d 986 (1943).
53 Id.
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penalty for having navigated the barge without a certificate
of inspection. The Kohala was a barge which had been converted
from a self-propelled vessel into a floating platform for use
by fishermen. She was anchored by two bow anchors and one
stern anchor in the Bay of Santa Monica, California. She had
likewise been anchored there for upwards of two years before
the government commenced legal action. 54 Monstad, the owner,
contended that as the vessel was at anchor, she was not
engaged in navigation, and hence did not require a certificate
of inspection. A certificate of inspection is ordinarily
required of vessels engaged in navigation. 55 The court
thought otherwise:
As so anchored by her commander, she [the Kohala] was
enabled to rise and fallon the slack of her anchor
chains with the rise and fall of the tide, and also
within the slack of the chains to move from right to left
through the water with the varying wind and tidal and
other currents of the harbor .... We do not believe that
the word 'navigate' should be confined to the moving of
a vessel from one port to another for the purposes of
transportation of goods or passengers. This vessel
necessarily must have moved from one place to another in
the water ... that is to say, she necessarily moved her
passengers across the ocean currents, and had a movement
in them She is nevertheless engaged in
navigation the word ... under statute ... including the
movements of a vessel within the range of her moorings or
anchor chains. 5 6
Thus, through Monstad, the legal definition of navigation
has been expanded to include vessels lying at anchor. Of no
54 Id. at 7.
55 Id. at 6.
56 Id. at 8-9.
23
lesser significance is the fact that the vessel had been
anchored for two years without getting under way, and during
all of that time she was held to be 'in navigation,.57 This
finding is significant in that it sets precedent for vessels
to be able to anchor for at least two years without ceasing to
be 'in navigation'.
A final case linking anchoring to navigation is that of
Kuramo v. Hamada. 58 At issue here was the contention of a
tenant of an exclusive Hawaiian fishery that he had paramount
rights over the area in question, the fishery within the
water-column, and the underlying lands. 59 This contention
arose when the tenant sought to prevent interference with his
exclusive fishing rights, from a mariner who was in the
practice of anchoring his vessel in the said tidal waters, and
selling bait to other fishermen. Although the court recognized
the tenant's exclusive rights to the fishery, it held that the
Territory of Hawaii owned the sUbmerged lands. As such, it was
the Territory's responsibility to ensure public rights over
the area. The court recognized navigation as a public right
and went on to state that the right of navigation includes, as
incident, the right of anchorage. GO
As it can be seen, case history indicates that the legal
57 rd. at 10.
58 Kuramo v. Hamada, 30 Haw. 841 (1929).
59 rd.
GO rd.
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definition of navigation is not limited simply to the passage
of a vessel over water, as may be suggested in the definitions
provided by dictionaries. Navigation does not necessitate that
a vessel be under way, manned, or free of her mooring. Vessels
engaged in the act of anchoring, or lying at anchor, are
engaged in acts of navigation. As navigation is a pub.Li,c
right, protected by the constitution (the commerce clause and
navigation servitude), the Submerged Lands Act, and the publ Lc
trust doctrine, it would logically follow that anchoring is
included within the protective powers of these well-
established doctrines.
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CHAPTER II: COMMON AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AFFECTING THE
ANCHORING CONFLICT
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
1) History of the Public Trust Doctrine
The pUblic trust doctrine has been called "one of the
most controversial developments in modern American law". 61
This may be partially due to the way in which it came to be
held as constitutional law. Public interests in navigable
waters can be traced back to the Roman institutes of Justinian
law, and the Magna carta. 62 Justinian law dictated that it
was an individual's right to " ... build a cottage, dry or
repair nets, fish, or use the banks of rivers to tie boats to
trees, and to place any part of their cargo there, even though
the banks of a river are private property ... "63 The
recognition of pubLi.c uses of the sea (and subsequently
navigable waters) can also be traced back to both African and
61 Charles Wilkinson, "The headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine", Northwestern
School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, Spring, 1989: 1.
62 Magna Carta reissue, 1225, chapter 23.
63 Amaral and Lee, Public Rights to Coastal Waters,
Rhode Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1992: xvii. "The
things which are naturally everybody's are air, flowing
water, the sea, and the sea-shore." J. Inst. 2.1.1-2.1.6 at
55 (P. Birks & G McLeod Trans., 1987.
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Native American cultures. In Nigeria, for example, the
inhabitants have historically enjoyed the right "to fish the
sea and enjoy free navigation in tidal and other large inland
waterways",64 while Native American cultures wholly denied
the possibility of ownership of land, air and water. 65
Justinian law played a significant role in shaping the
foundation of what was later to become English Common law.
English Common law was then to become the most direct source
of modern American law, and hence, the pUblic trust doctrine.
Typically, the British favored private ownership of land
resources, but likewise made an exception for navigable
waterways.66 Common law upheld a distinction between the
"jus privatum" (private property), which the King could
transfer to individuals, either for money or some other form
of compensation, and the "jus pUblicum" (public property),
which was held in trust for the pUblic. 67 The areas which
were most important to the public rights were both the coasts,
and those stretches of rivers which were affected by the ebb
and flow of the tides.
By the time that Sir Matthew Hale produced his landmark
64 Wilkinson, "Headwaters of the Public Trust",
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College,
Spring, 1989: 1-
65 Id.
66 dI ., at 2.
67 Id.
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legal work, De Jure Maris (1670),68 the legal presumption
was that riparian land owners had the exclusive right to use
the beds and banks along their adjoining fresh-water rivers.
This presumption, however, was sUbject to a pUblic right to
use the beds and banks for purposes incidental to navigation,
where the pUblic had acquired that right by prescription or
custom. 6 9 The beds and banks of navigable rivers were in
fact used by the pubLi.c , as a matter of right, for "anchoring,
mooring, and towing vessels along the banks, where the pUblic
had need for such uses." 7 0 Subsequently, where there was a
conflict with the pUblic right of navigation, the right of
navigation prevailed. 71 Thus, the act of anchoring a vessel
was upheld as an inalienable public right through the
doctrines of English Common law.
English Common law later went on to become the law of the
thirteen colonies, and eventually, upon ratification of the
Constitution, the law of the thirteen original states. 72
Before the Revolutionary War, by grants from the Crown, the
thirteen colonies held title to lands within their borders.
68 Sir Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, 1 Hargrave Tracts,
5-44, London, 1787.
69 Wilkinson, "Headwaters of the Public Trust",
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College,
Spring, 1989: 3.
70 Id., at 49.
71 dI .
72 Amaral and Lee, Public Rights to Coastal Waters,
Rhode Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1990: xviii.
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They also had title to areas of coastline and subme+ged lands.
SUbsequent to the formation of the new United states,
the colonies (now states) adopted the Constitution, hence
forming a single union bound together by a common legislative
body. The states, however, withheld both their tidelands and
navigable waters from the United States, thereby not ceding
these lands to the new Federal government. 7 3 As a result,
authority held by the states over these tidelands and
navigable waters (trust lands) is plenary, SUbject only to the
powers surrendered to the Federal government upon ratification
of the Constitution. The Constitution subsequently provides
that it, all Federal laws and international treaties "shall be
the supreme law of the land".74 Hence, although a state may
have title to, and extend authority over a certain area of
navigable water and its underlying lands, Federal or
constitutional provisions and doctrines affecting the same
area are superior to those of the state. Thus, state laws
which are in conflict with federal policy are preempted by
federal authority.
2) Expansion of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine
Both the existence of the public trust doctrine as a
facet of constitutional law, and its significance in enabling
73 Id.
74 Id.
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the federal government to use its powers of preemption over
state legislative acts, were affirmed in the important case of
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois (1892) .75
In 1869 the state of Illinois granted more than 1000
acres of state land to the Illinois Central Railroad Co .. The
area granted comprised a substantial portion of chicago's
waterfront on Lake Michigan, a navigable lake. The grant also
included sUbmerged lands in chicago's harbor. The area was
described as being:
... as large as that embraced by all the merchandise docks
along the Thames at London; is much larger than that
included in the famous docks and basins at Liverpool; is
twice that of the port of Marseilles, and nearly if not
equal to the1%ier area along the water front of the city
of New York.
Four years after said lands were given to the railroad
company, the state, amid cries of corruption, revoked the
grant. 7 7
75 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892). The Illinois Central case is considered to be
the cornerstone of legal matters dealing with the pUblic
trust doctrine.
76 dI . at 454.
77 Although the state maintained that certain
limitations had been placed on the railroad company's
control of the harbor beds, the railroad company treated the
conveyance as an "absolute conveyance to it of title to the
submerged lands, giving it, as full and complete power to
use and dispose of the same, except in the technical
transfer of the fee, in any manner it may choose, as if they
were uplands, in no respect covered or affected by navigable
waters." Id. at 450. See also wilkinson, "The Headwaters of
the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine", Spring,
1989: 83.
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The Supreme Court recognized that Illinois received title
to the harbor upon entering the Union, and ratifying the
constitution. This title, however, implicitly carne with a
publ ic trust in order to keep the waterways open to the
pUblic, for uses such as navigation, commerce, and
fishing78. Thus, any grant which might deprive the public of
these rights would necessarily be revokable. The court went on
to state that:
••• A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of
a state has never been adjudged to be within the
legislative power, and any attempted grant of the kind
would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as
SUbject to revocation ..• It is the settled law of this
country that the ownership and dominion and sovereignty
over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of
the several states, belong to the respective states
within which they are found, with the consequent right to
use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be
done without substantial impairment of the interest of
the public in the waters, and SUbject always to the
paramount right of Congress to control their navigation
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations and among the states. 7 9
The major result of Illinois Central is that the court
both recognized pUblic trust rights in the affected, submerged
lands, and used constitutional powers to ensure that the
public would be able to enjoy those rights. The case also
helped to define the scope of the public trust doctrine, and
78 Id. Navigation, commerce and fishing have been
traditional pUblic trust rights throughout the history of
the modern American public trust doctrine.
79 Illinois Central Railroad Co v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892), at 453 & 435.
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cast it into the existing body of federal case law. Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that states are
granted a wide degree of discretion in administering the
trust. None of the ensuing opinions, however, have disturbed
Illinois Central's premise that the pubLi,c trust doctrine
applies to all navigable watercourses as a matter of federal
law. 8 0
At the time during which Illinois Central was decided,
the rights of the pUblic in pUblic trust areas were those of
fishing, commerce and navigation. Recently, however, the
coverage of the public trust has been expanded to include
recreation as an additional public right. In Marks v.
Whitney,81 the court found that "trust purposes are far
broader than traditional uses of navigation, commerce and
fishing, and include uses such as open space and wildlife
habitat, use for scientific purposes, hunting, bathing and
swimming.,,82 Likewise, in Orion Corp. v. washington,83 the
80 Wilkinson, "The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
of the Traditional Doctrine", Northwestern School of Law of
Lewis and Clark College, spring, 1989: 14. The standards
which were set out in Illinois Central were reaffirmed in
cases such as shively v. Bowlby, 152, U.S. 1 (1894), where
the court stated that "[lands under tidewaters] are of great
value to the pUblic for the purposes of commerce,
navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by individuals,
when permitted is incidental or subordinate to the pUblic
use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them
are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole
people."
81 Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251 (1971).
82 Id. at 259-60.
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court stated that public trust rights include "navigation,
fishing, swimming, water skiing, and other related
recreational purposes.,,84 Finally, in Menzer v. Village of
Elkhart Lake,aS the public trust doctrine was expanded
exponentially to include "all pUblic uses of water.,,86
The pUblic trust doctrine has also been used as a means
by Which regUlations which place restrictions on the ability
of the pUblic to enjoy public trust rights have been
invalidated. In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Association,87 the court addressed the question of whether
a quasi-public association could exclude, or charge higher
fees to non-association members for beach access. The
association owns a street-wide strip of land Which spans the
length of the beach, is located at the foot of seven pUblic
streets, and extends down to the mean high water mark. Except
for a short period during low tides, beach access necessitates
passing over land controlled by the association. The
association maintained the beach, and employed life guards
along its span during the summer months. Use of the beach was
83 Orion Corp v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d. 621 (1987),
Cert. denied; 108 s. ct. 1996 (1988).
84 Id. at 640-41.
85 Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d
(1971).
86 Id. at 70.
87 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95
N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984).
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restricted to members during certain hours of the day, and
members who were not residents of Bay Head were charged higher
membership fees than residents. Another significant factor in
the case is that there are no public beaches in the Borough of
Bay Head.
In examining the case, the court held that if the
residents of every municipality bordering the New Jersey shore
were to adopt the Bay Head pol icy, the pubI ic would be
prevented from exercising its right to enjoy the foreshore.
Thus, the Bay Head Policy was found to be contrary to the
purpose of the public trust doctrine, and hence not
permissible. Likewise, the court held that the association
could not charge fees which would distinguish in any way
between residents and non-residents. 8 8
In a similar New Jersey case, Neptune city v. Borough of
Avon by the sea,89 the New Jersey Supreme court prohibited
municipalities from charging higher fees to non-residents than
to residents for the use of city beaches. Although the
plaintiffs did not argue their case as one involving the
pUblic trust doctrine, the court supplied the view that the
"public trust doctrine dictates that a beach and ocean waters
must be open to all on equal terms and without preferance and
88 Id.
89 Neotune city v. Borough of Avon by the Sea, 61 N.J.
296 (1972).
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that any contrary state or municipal action is
impermissible. ,,90
As it can be seen, the publ ic trust doctr ine is both
powerful and broad-reaching. Navigation and recreation, which
are both closely associated with sailing, cruising, and other
manifestations of water-bourne activities have been repeatedly
upheld as pUblic rights. In the United states, these rights
are inalienable, in the same respect as are freedoms of
speech, religion and education. To restrict navigation and
recreation by the imposition of fees, or the requirement of
permits which may potentially be denied, is akin to placing
similar restrictions on speech, relegion and education.
Likewise, if anchoring is an activity associated with
navigation, recreation, or directly linked to the pUblic trust
doctrine, laws which impose unnecessary restrictions on
anchoring may be contrary to public trust interests and hence
unconstitutional.
3) The Public Trust in Hawaii
In assessing the constitutionality of anchoring laws
which have been enacted in the State of Hawaii, it is
important to take into consideration Hawaii's unique status of
being a state which joined the Union only a relatively short
while ago. Although currently a state liable to all federal
90 Id. at 47.
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laws and constitutional provisions, Hawaii still retains some
vestiges of legal concepts enacted under its previous
monarchy. One example of this is the historical recognition of
private rights of ownership over fishponds. Although many
Hawaiian fishponds are located in the coastal zone and fit the
definition provided by the federal government of "navigable
waters", they are recognized as private property. 91 This
concept of ownership is akin to that of a farmer over
farmland, as both are used as a means of providing food both
for the owner and for sale to other members of the community.
In this respect, the recognition of private rights over what
would normally be considered pUblic resources is in accordance
with the pUblic interest.
Through its unique historical background, Hawaii has
expanded, in some respects, the uses involved in the pUblic
trust. The following legal cases are provided with the
intention of clarifying those expansions under Hawaiian law.
The first case which acknowledged the application of
pUblic trust rights in Hawaii was that of King v. Oahu Railway
& Land Co .. 92 The case was similar to Illinois Central in
that it involved a railway company attempting to condemn
submerged lands and alienate them from the pUblic for railroad
purposes. The Hawaiian territorial court, however, declared
91 Kaiser-Aetna v. United states, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
92 King v. Oahu Railway and Land Co., 11 Haw. 717
(1899).
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that the lands under the navigable waters in and around the
territory of Hawaii were held in trust for public uses. The
court went on to recognize that these publ dc trust uses
included "navigation, sailing and anchorage of vessels. "93
The unique legal status of Hawaiian fishponds is
illustrated in Kaiser-Aetna v. United states. 9 4 The issue in
this case took into consideration the legal status of a
private Hawaiian fishpond which was transformed into a marina
servicing an exclusive commercial and residential development.
Before the development of the Hawaii-Kai Marina, Kuapa Pond
was a shallow lagoon, separated from Maunalua Bay and the
Pacific Ocean by a barrier beach. 9 5 It was subject to the
ebb and flow of Pacific tides, and was navigated by shallow-
draft f i ahLnq vessels for private fishing purposes. Upon
creating the marina, the owners dredged the lagoon, and made
openings in the barrier beach to allow the passage of larger
vessels. 9 6 Upon opening the lagoon to accommodate the
passage of vessels other than the original fishing vessels,
the United states, through the Army Corps of Engineers made
the contentions that (A) since the lagoon now fit the federal
definition of a navigable waterway, the marina was SUbject to
93 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept. of
the Interior, 1978: 327.
94 Kaiser-Aetna v. United states, 444 US 164 (1979).
95 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 152.
96 Id. at 153, 154.
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Army Corps regulation under Section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act,97 and,(B) as a navigable waterway, the public
was free to navigate the waters of the lagoon without being
sUbject to fees. 9 B The court recognized the unique status of
Hawaiian fishponds, and in deciding the case, held that
although Army Corps jurisdiction could be extended over the
lagoon, the owners still retained a private interest in the
development, and could therefore continue to charge boating
and mooring fees. 9 9
Even with Hawaii's recognition of the special status of
fishponds, it should also be noted that in some cases, where
a tenant's exclusive rights over a fishery have been upheld,
the courts have limited that right strictly to the fishery,
and not to the geographical area in which the fishing is being
conducted. One such example of this concept is illustrated in
Kuramo v. Hamada. 1 00
In this case, the tenant of an exclusive fishery sought
to prevent interference with his exclusive fishing rights from
a boatman who would anchor his vessel in the tidal waters and
sell bait to others. The court held that although the tenant
had established exclusive fishing rights, these rights were
97 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, u.S. Dept of
The Interior, 1978: 329.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Kuramo v. Hamada, 30 Haw. 841 (1929).
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limited to the fishery. There was no evidence that the tenant
had established private rights to the lands underlying the
tidal waters, hence it was presumed that the Territory owned
the land in question and all the rights incidental
thereto. l Ol The court then went on to establish that when
rights of fishery and navigation come into conflict, the right
of navigation is paramount. l 02 This conclusion echoes the
vestiges of English Common law. Finally, the court held that
the right of navigation included the right of anchorage, and
denied the requested injunction. 1 03
As it can be seen, Hawaii is somewhat unique in that it
recognizes, in certain instances, a private interest in what
might elsewhere be held to be pUblic domain. This is important
with regard to anchorage laws, in that in some very specific
circumstances, the collection of fees from anchored and moored
vessels may be a permissible activity. Evidence indicates,
that this may only be done by private parties, within the
limits of what has been legally recognized to be their private
lands. Evidence, however, does not justify the imposition of
restrictions or fees on anchored vessels in state-owned lands
(lands SUbject to the public trust). On the contrary, Hawaiian
case law has shown navigation, and more specifically
101 Id.
102 dI .
103 Id. See also Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon,
u.S. Dept of THe Interior, 1978, at 328.
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anchoring, to be activities consistent with the public's use
of state-owned lands (public trust rights).
The conclusion to be drawn from this data is that laws
which may potentially serve to deny, restrict, or place
incidental burdens upon navigation or anchoring are contrary
to pUblic trust interests. Therefore, through the application
of the pUblic trust doctrine, such laws may be found to be
unconstitutional.
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B. The Federal Navigation Servitude
During the years which followed independence from
Britain, the early settlers established paths of both
exploration and trade along the watercourses of the newly
formed nation. These watercourses functioned as transportation
routes, and their shores became the logical areas for
settlement. 104 Recognition of the importance of an
unimpeded system of transportation (and navigation) can be
seen as far back as the era of George Washington. While
traveling through the nation's interior, washington said:
... 1 could not help taking a more extensive view of the
vast inland navigation of these United states and could
not but be struck by the immense extent and importance of
it, and of the goodness of that providence which has
dealt its favors to us with so profuse a hand. Would to
God we may have the wisdom to improve them. 105
Washington's sentiment was echoed in Article IV of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 106 The Ordinance provides
that:
104 S. Dunbar, A History of Travel in America, New
York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1915: 16-17.
105 Wilkinson, "The Headwaters of the Public Trust:
Some of the Traditional Doctrine", Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis and Clark College, Spring, 1989: 55, quoting
George Washington.
106 Northwest Ordinance, Ch. 8, 1., Stat. 50, 52
(1789) .
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The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and st.
Lawrence and the carrying places between the same, shall
be common highways, and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of
the United states, and those of any other states that may
be admitted into the Confederacy, without any tax,
import, or duty therefor. 1 07
Thus, congressional recognition of the importance of free
navigation was codified into law, thereby reinforcing the
concept of navigation as a pUblic right.
The federal navigation servitude is the paramount right
of the federal government, under the commerce clause of the
United states Constitution to compel the removal of any
obstructions to navigation without necessarily having to pay
"just compensation" which is ordinarily required by the Fifth
Amendment. 1 0 a Although similar in spirit, the pUblic trust
doctrine and the navigation servitude are separate and
distinct doctrines. The public trust doctrine is developed
from the common law, and generally applies to the states. The
federal navigation servitude, however, accomplishes at the
federal level some of the same things which the pUblic trust
doctrine accomplishes at the state level. One of the oldest
uses of the public trust doctrine is the preservation of
navigation. The federal navigation servitude is designed to
preserve navigation, hence the two distinct doctrines can
107 Id. at 52.
loa Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 147.
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accomplish the same purpose on two different levels. 1 09
The navigation servitude is derived from the commerce
clause, which is the third clause of Article 1, section 8 of
the united states constitution. 11 0 This section provides
that:
The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes ... and to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the united states or in
any department or offices thereof. 111
For many years after the enactment of the Constitution,
Congress did little or nothing to establish a federal
navigation servitude. 112 This was to change in 1824, in the
Supreme Court case of Gibbons v. Ogden « 113 which may very
well be considered the cornerstone of the navigation
servitude. The case arose when the defendant, Gibbons, a
steamboat owner, challenged the constitutionality of a New
109 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.S. Dept of
The Interior, 1978: 140. At the state level, the public
trust doctrine and the navigation servitude are often
discussed together. This is understandable in view of the
similar results which they can accomplish.
110 The Constitution of the united states, Article 1,
Section 8, Sept. 17, 1787.
111 Id.
112 sweat, "Water Related Property", practicing Law
Inst, 1990: 8.
113 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 23 (1824).
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York statute, which gave Robert Fulton the exclusive right of
navigation of the waters of the state by steamboat. The United
states Supreme court held that the New York legislation was
repugnant to the constitution and especially to the commerce
clause, and therefore void. 114 In deciding the case, Chief
Justice Marshall defined the meaning of commerce within the
commerce clause as comprehending navigation:
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our
constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of
enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the
extent of the power it becomes necessary to settle the
meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would
limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the
interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it
comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general
term, applicable to many objects, to one of its
significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it
is something more; it is intercourse. It describes the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The
mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating
commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws
concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the
admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports
of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for
the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of
buying and selling, or of barter ... The power of Congress,
then, comprehends navigation within the limits of every
state in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in
any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign
nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian
tribes,.115
Like the pUblic trust doctrine, the scope of the
navigation servitude has expanded over time. One of the
114 dI .
115 Id. at 188, 190.
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earliest cases to both incorporate the navigation servitude,
and expand its scope to include submerged lands was that of
Gibson v. United states. 116 The case was brought to recover
damages resulting from the construction of a dike by the
United states Government. In assessing the case, the court
stated that:
All navigable waters are under the control of the United
states for the purpose of regulating and improving
navigation, and although the title to the shore and
submerged soil is in the various states and individual
owners under it, it is always subject to the [navigation]
servitude in respect of navigation created in favor of
the federal government by the Constitution. 1 17
In recent years, the scope of the navigation servitude
has gone beyond its original spirit of dealing strictly with
trade-related commerce. It has been expanded to include
recreational boats of all sizes. 118 One authority describes
this expansion in the following terms:
All state-created rights in navigable waters are subject
to the exercise of paramount constitutional powers by the
United states in areas of national concern which require
uniform regulation. Perhaps the most extensive of these
powers is the power to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce ... Here, the concern is with the extent and scope
116 Gibson v. United states, 166 U.S. 1000 (1897).
117 Id. at 271, 272.
118 Dennis Nixon, "Evolution of Public and Private
Rights to Rhode Island's Shore", Suffolk Univ. Law Rev.,
Summer 1990: 3.
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of the limitations, under the commerce clause, that are
placed on public and private rights established under
state law. Of course, any state law or property rule,
inconsistent with the federal exercise of power described
here, cannot withstand a challenge which raises the
federal question. On the other hand, the publ Lc is
relatively free to exercise recreational uses of
navigable waters under federal control when these uses
are consistent with the paramount federal program or
national interest. 119
Although the navigation servitude does not specifically
grant that the federal government has the power to supercede
state authority with regard to the establishment of laws which
regulate anchoring, such power may be distilled from the
definition of navigation, and more specifically, the
association of anchoring with such a definition. If anchoring
is an attribute of navigation, then laws which regulate
anchoring may be subject to federal preemption through the
navigation servitude, established in both the Constitution and
the SUbmerged Lands Act. This association, of course, is
dependant upon the definition of navigation.
119 Leighty, "The Source and Scope of Public and
Private Rights in Navigable Waters", Land and Water Law
Rev., 1978: 391, 425, 426.
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c. The state Police Power
The state police power, like the public trust doctrine,
operates in favor of the protection of pUblic rights. The
police power is hence an inherent attribute of
sovereignty.120 A state's extension of police power has
been recognized as providing the justification behind which
some laws which may affect navigation have been enacted. 121
The united states Supreme Court, in an 1847 case upholding the
constitutionality of licensing statutes, defined police
power: 122
[The police powers of a state] ... are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether
a state passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish
offenders, or to establish courts of justice, or
requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to
regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it
exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of
sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within
the limits of its domain. It is by virtue of this power
that it legislates; and its authority to make regulations
of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health
laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the
120 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, u.S. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 81.
121 Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991).
122 Id. at 82. See also License Cases, 46 U.S. 504
(1847). These consolidated cases involved various state
statutes which regUlated, licensed or prohibited the sale of
alcoholic beverages. It was claimed that these statutes were
unconstitutional or in violation of the federal power to
regulate interstate commerce.
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constitution
The police power is derived from the Tenth Amendment to
the united states Constitution, which reads: "The powers not
delegated to the United states by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people. "124 Accordingly, the
leading police power cases in the United states Supreme Court
involve appeals from state supreme court decisions, in which
state legislation was attacked as being
unconstitutional. 125 Although police power cases usually
involve state police powers, the Supreme Court has also both
referred to and reaffirmed an analogous implied federal power
over federal property.126 Likewise, it has been held that
federal exertion of the power to regulate commerce under the
123 License Cases, 46 U.S. 504 (1847) at 53.
124 The Constitution of The United States, Amendment X,
1791.
125 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 82. Usually, the United states
constitutional provisions involved are fifth and fourteenth
amendments, prohibiting the taking of private property
without just compensation. The issue is also of importance
in anchoring laws because of the very nature of claims of
unconstitutionality thereof.
126 Id. at 83. See also Camfield v. United states, 167
U.S. 122 (1887) at 525.: " .•. and even over public land
within the states, the general government doubtless has a
power over its own property analogous to the police power of
the several states, and the extent to which it may go in the
exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the
particular case."
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commerce clause is attended by the same incidents which attend
the exercise of the police powers of the state. 127
Generally, police powers are employed when such regulation
becomes necessary to preserve the public good.
Like the public trust doctrine, the roots of state and
federal police powers may be found in English Common law.
several examples of valid regulation for the common good can
be seen in the following excerpt from sir Matthew Hale's De
portibus Maris:
A man for his own private advantage, may, in a port or
town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he
and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage,
housellage, pesage, for he doth no more than is lawful
for any man to do, viz.: makes the most of his own. If
the King or SUbject have a public wharf, unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or
lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the
wharfs only licensed by the Queen, or because there is no
other wharf in that port as it may fallout where a port
is neWly erected: in that case there cannot be taken
arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage,
pesage, etc. neither can they be enhanced to an
immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and
moderate, though settled by the King's license or
charter. For now the wharf and crane and other
conveniences are effected with a pubLi.o interest and they
cease to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a
street in a new building on his own land, it is now no
longer bare .nr-Lvat;e interest, but is affected by a pubLi,c
interest. 128"
Despite having similar bases in common law principles,
there is a significant difference between the police power and
127 dI .
128 Id. at 85, quoting sir Matthew Hale.
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the public trust doctrine. In essence, the pUblic trust
doctrine prescribes a series of pubLi,c rights, while the
police power may be used as a means of ensuring those rights.
with regard to the ownership of submerged lands, public trust
property is sUbject to an ownership interest retained by the
state on behalf of the pUblic and is applicable only to those
pUblic areas. The police power, however, reaches all property,
private and public, but as to private property, the public
interest is not an ownership interest, and the power to
regulate is accordingly limited. 1 2 9
129 Id at 86.
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CHAPTER III: STATUTORY ISSUES AFFECTING THE ANCHORING
CONFLICT
A. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953
1) History of the Submerged Lands Act
Up until the middle half of the twentieth century, there
was little if any question as to who held title to a state's
sUbmerged lands. The original thirteen states viewed
themselves as having both jurisdiction over and ownership of
the resources of this area. Likewise, the states recognized
that such jurisdiction and ownership was sUbject only to the
overriding constitutional powers of the federal government to
regulate matters of navigation, commerce and foreign
affairs. 130 Under the equal footing doctrine, states which
were subsequently admitted to the Union adopted similar
assump~ions, and enjoyed the right to extend authority over
their sUbmerged lands, again being only sUbject to
constitutional provisions.
Although not the first time the issue was examined,131
the idea of state ownership of submerged lands was
130 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 407.
131 Martin v. Waddell similarly examined the question
in 1842.
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sUbstantially affirmed through the 1845 Supreme Court decision
in Pollard v. Hagan. 1 32. The case concerned a dispute over
the ownership of a lot on Mobile Bay, in Mobile, Alabama. The
sole question was whether Congress had the power to grant to
private ownership lands which had been below navigable waters
at the time that Alabama had been admitted into the Union, but
had become fast land by the receding of the high water mark in
sUbsequent years1 33. The court found that whether the water
had receded by natural causes or by human intervention,
Congress did not have the authority to grant title, as
ownership was in the state. The court stated that:
Then to Alabama belong the navigable waters, and soils
under them, in controversy in this case, subject to the
rights surrendered by the Constitution of the United
States; and no compact between her and the united States
could diminish or enlarge these rights. 1 34
The idea of state ownership and jurisdiction over
submerged lands was held to be almost sacrosanct for over one
hundred years, until a chain of events beginning in the early
twentieth century shattered that trend. The issue did not
become important until oil and gas were discovered offshore in
132 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, (1845).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 573. The court also considered the power of
the United States to convey pUblic lands and held that the
power of Congress over the public lands (or public domain)
conferred no power to grant the shores of navigable waters
and the soils under them which were not granted by the
Constitution to the United states, but were reserved to the
States respectively.
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both the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. 1 35 As early
as 1921, the California legislature began to enact legislation
authorizing leases within three English (land) miles of the
California coast. 1 36 This practice was initially accepted
by the federal government until 1945. 137
In 1945, the federal government sought a decree declaring
federal ownership of lands off the shore of California,
underlying the Pacific Ocean, out to the extent of the "three-
mile belt".138 The federal government brought suit against
the state of California, alleging that the United states was
the owner of the lands in question. 13 9 California contended
that the three-mile belt was a part of the land underlying the
navigable waters which passed to the state on attaining
statehood.
135 Ray Sweat, "water Related Property, Creditors'
Rights and Forfeiture of Title", Practicing Law Inst., Dec.,
1990: 31.
136 Id. The inland waters, bays, gulfs and estuaries,
and water extending seaward three nautical miles (3.45
English, or land miles), from the low water mark are known
as the territorial waters within the jurisdiction and
sovereignty of the coastal state or country. The three
nautical miles, or one marine league, was thought to be the
extent of the effective range of land-based weapons near the
end of the eighteenth century. Areas beyond this distance
were thought to be the high seas, common to all nations. Id.
at 5.
137 Kalo: Coastal and Ocean Law,: 407.
138 Helen Althaus, PUblic Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s.
Dept. of The Interior, 1978: 201.
139 Sweat, "Water Related Property", Practicing Law
Inst., 1990: 30.
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In evaluating the case, the Supreme Court held that the
three-mile belt was owned by the united States, and not solely
by California. The court pointed out that historically the
three-mile belt was a concept which came after the
revolutionary war, and that it was the federal government that
sUbsequently gained dominion over it. 1 40 The precedent
which was thought to have been established since Pollard v.
Hagan was dismissed when the court emphasized that the
nation's
involved:
international responsibilities may have been
What this government does, or even what the states do,
anywhere in the ocean, is a subject upon which the nation
may enter into and assume treaty or similar international
obligations ... the very oil about which the state and
nation here contend might well become the sUbject of
international dispute and settlement ... The ocean, even
its three-mile belt, is thus of valid consequence to the
nation in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in
peace with the world ... Conceding that the state has been
authorized to exercise local police power functions in
the part of the marginal belt within its declared
boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal
Government's paramount rights in and power over this
area. 141
Accordingly, the court ruled that federal rights are paramount
in the three-mile belt.
Following the California decision, the Attorney General
of the United states immediately filed similar cases against
140 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept of
The Interior, 1978: 202.
141 United states v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), at
35, 36, 91.
54
Louisiana and Texas, the two other big oil producing states.
By 1950, the Supreme Court had announced similar decisions in
favor of the United States. 142
The decisions in these cases caused quite a bit of
controversy, which was soon felt by Congress. Likewise, their
outcome brought drilling for oil and gas almost to a complete
standstill. The first congressional action in response to the
deleterious situation was to create Senate Joint Resolution
Twenty, which would have quitclaimed all federal interests in
the submerged lands to the coastal states, and restored
ownership of the submerged lands within the three-mile limit
to the respective states143. Congress sent the resolution
to then President Truman in 1952, but the President, being a
firm proponent of federal ownership of offshore resources,
vetoed the bill. 144 Subsequently, numerous bills which were
similar in character were also introduced by Congress, but
alas were consistently opposed as "giveaway
legislation" .145 The controversy came to be known as the
"tidelands issue", and was a major factor during the 1952
142 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, u.S. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 204. See also United States v.
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United States v. Texas,
339 U.S. 707 (1950).
143 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 412.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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Presidential elections. 146
Truman's efforts to preserve federal ownership of
submerged lands were quickly reversed upon General
Eisenhower's election to the Presidency. On May 22, 1953,
Eisenhower signed the Submerged Lands Act into law. 147 By
this statute, the United states relinquished and assigned
title and ownership of the disputed submerged lands to the
respective coastal states. 148
146 Ernest Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy,
Austin, University of Texas Press, 1953: 3-5.
147 dI .
148 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 204.
56
2) Selected Provisions of the Submerged Lands Act
The Submerged Lands Act established the ownership by the
states of the lands periodically or permanently covered by
tidal waters up to, but not beyond, the mean high tide line,
extending seaward to an arbitrary line three geographical
miles from the mean low tide line. 149 The Act further
provided that, as to the states bordering the Gulf of Mexico,
ownership would extend seaward up to three marine leagues from
the coastline, if their original boundaries had extended that
distance. 150
The Act also served as a means of conferring the "natural
resources" within the three-mile band to the respective
coastal state. A very specific definition of the constitution
of "natural resources" was provided in the Act:
The term 'natural resources' includes, without limiting
the generality thereof, oil, gas and other minerals, and
fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges,
kelp, and other marine animal and plant life but does not
include water power, or the use of water for the
149 Sweat, "Water Related Property", Practicing Law
Inst., 1990: 33.
150 Id. In United States v. Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, and Texas, 364 U.S. 502 (1960) and United
states v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 285 (1965), the United States
Supreme Court confirmed title in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi three geographical miles seaward from their
coastlines and in Florida and Texas, three leagues seaward
from their respective coasts. This fixed the title to all
the lands, minerals and other natural resources underlying
the Gulf of Mexico to the lines previously described.
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production of power. 15 1
By virtue of the Submerged Lands Act and the sUbsequent
sovereignty imparted on the states over the resources lying
within the three mile territorial sea, states are allowed to
enact laws which affect these resources. Hence, as an anchor
dropped overboard from a vessel navigating in a state's waters
comes to rest on the sUbmerged land under the vessel, the
anchor lies on state-owned land. If done in a careless manner,
such an anchor could be very hazardous to a coral resource. In
this respect, the Act may be interpreted as providing the
justification by which states have enacted laws to regulate
anchoring. The question of anchoring as an act of navigation,
however, becomes a point of interest at this juncture, as its
regulation may be preempted by the federal government through
the implications of section 1314, (a), of the Act:
The United states retains all its navigational servitude
and rights in and power of regulation and control of said
lands and navigable waters for the constitutional
purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and
international affairs, all of which shall be paramount
to, but shall not be deemed to include proprietary rights
of ownership or the rights of management, administration,
leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural
resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed,
established and vested in and assigned to the res~ective
states and others by section 1311 of this title. 52
151 Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C., Section
1301 (e).
152 Id. Section 1314 (a).
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Thus, although a state may be justified in regulating or
collecting revenues from the use of its submerged lands, the
applicability of state laws which purport to do so is limited
by the powers retained by the federal government through the
navigation servitude.
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B. Federal Regulatory Authority: Coast Guard versus Army Corps
One of the questions which has been raised with regard to
the anchoring conflict is exactly which federal agency has
been entrusted with the duty to oversee matters of navigation,
and more specificly matters of anchoring? The choice lies
between the Coast Guard (the regulatory arm of the Department
of Transportation), and the Army Corps of Engineers (the
regulatory arm of the Department of Defense). While the Army
Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) does oversee matters
concerning the maintenance of unobstructed navigation, the
Coast Guard is likewise employed in similar duties. In light
of the matters discussed in this project, it is more
appropriate to consider the Coast Guard as the primary federal
regulatory authority. It is likewise important to consider the
extent of authority held by the Army Corps.
1) The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
The authority of the Army Corps as the federal body
responsible for ensuring free navigation began with the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899. 153 The Act gave the Corps
regulatory control over the navigable waters of the United
states, and the power to enforce the laws of the federal
153 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 401
et. seq.
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government in such waters. The Army Corps' regulatory
authority over navigation and commerce was derived indirectly
from the United States Constitution. 154 In general, the
Army Corps' regulatory activities primarily consisted of
reviewing proposed projects, and issuing and enforcing permits
for activities undertaken in navigable waters of the United
states. 155 That these responsibilities were intended to
prevent obstructions to navigation is evident in the
provisions of the Act:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress to the navigable capacity of any
of the waters of the United states is prohibitedi ... it
shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of
any Wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater,
bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any
port ... harbor ... or other water of the United States,
except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers,
and authorized by the Secretary of the Army .... I56
It should be noted that the 'obstructions to navigation'
indicated in the provisions of the Act primarily refer to
physical obstructions to navigation. Wharfs, piers, and
154 The power to regUlate matters of commerce and
navigation is derived from Congressional power under the
United states Constitution, Art.1, Sec.8, "the commerce
clause". Although control over navigable waters is not
specificly granted to the government in the Constitution,
the Supreme Court held in Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824),
that the power to regUlate commerce includes the power to
regUlate navigation, hence navigable waters.
155 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 171.
156 33 U.S.C. Sec. 403. Obstruction of navigable
waters.
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breakwaters are all items which may pose a physical hazard to
navigation, thus affecting the navigable capacity of any
particular body of water. Research has not indicated the
existence of any 'anchorage laws' which may have been
considered to pose an obstruction to navigation at the time
when the Act was passed. Likewise, the legislative history of
the Rivers and Harbors Act does not indicate that it was to be
used to regulate the anchoring of vessels. Army Corps
jurisdiction over acts of navigation, such as anchoring, may
have been implied in the early part of this century simply
because of the fact that no other federal regulatory body with
powers over navigable waters existed at that time.
The United states Coast Guard did not come into existence
until the early part of 1915, when it was officially
established through the Department of Transportation
Act. 157 This Act served to combine the existing United
states revenue cutter, and life-saving services into one
consolidated group, presided over by the Department of
Transportation. Later, the Lighthouse Service of the
Department of Commerce was to be incorporated into this group
as well. 158
The Department of Transportation Act served to transfer
all functions, powers and duties of the Secretary of the Army
157 Department of Transportation Act, 80 Stat. 931.,
January, 1915.
158 Presidential Reorganization Plan No.2, July 1,
1939.
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under specified laws, to the secretary of
Transportation. 159 These laws specifically applied to
navigation and anchorage areas. 160 The Secretary of
Transportation, in turn, delegated to the Commandant of the
Coast Guard the authority to exercise the powers of the
Secretary with respect to anchorages and navigation. 161
section 7 of the River and Harbor Act of March 4,
1915,162 empowers the Coast Guard with the authority to
establish anchorage grounds for vessels in the navigable
waters of the united States "whenever it is apparent that
[anchorage grounds] are required by the maritime or commercial
interests of the United States for safe navigation.,,163 The
provisions of the Act go on to establish that:
District Commanders will, whenever matters relating to
the anchorage of vessels are under consideration,
ascertain the view of the District and Division Engineer,
Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, and the proper
representatives of other departments likely to be
. t t d 164ln eres e ....
159 Id. at 6(g).
160 Coast Guard Regulations, 33 C.F.R., Sec. 109.01
(1989) .
161 Department of Transportation Order 1100.1 See also
49 C.F.R. 1.4 (a) (3).
162 River and Harbor Act of March 4, 1915, 33 U.S.C.
471.
163 Coast Guard Regulations, 33 C.F.R. Sec. 109.05.
164 Id. at 109.05 (b).
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This provision is important in that it places the
authority of the Coast Guard and Army Corps into perspective.
While it is primarily the duty of the Coast Guard to oversee
matters concerning the anchorage of vessels, this duty does
not preclude the Army Corps from supplying their own input,
hence a degree of authority, into the matter. It is, however,
primarily the Coast Guard that extends prevailing power over
the matter.
That it is Coast Guard, rather than Army Corps authority
that is primarily extended over such matters of navigation as
anchoring, is further expressed in the provisions of the Ports
and waterways Safety Act: 165
The United States Coast Guard [is authorized] to specify
times of movement within ports and harbors, restrict
vessel operations in hazardous areas and under hazardous
conditions, and direct the anchoring of vessels. 1 66
Here, it is specifically stated that it is the duty of the
Coast Guard to "direct the anchoring of vessels". This should
leave no doubt that, while both the Army Corps and the Coast
Guard share a concurrent authority over matters concerning
navigation, this authority is divided in respect to the
different facets of navigation. While the Army Corps is
involved in the permit process, and seems to be more concerned
165 Ports and waterways safety Act, 49 C.F.R. 1.46 (n).
166 Coast Guard Regulations, 33 C.F.R. Sec. 109.07,
citing Ports and waterways safety Act.
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with physical obstacles to free navigation, the Coast Guard
seems to be more involved with the actual passage of vessels,
their safety, and related regulations of navigation. Hence,
for the purposes of this research, it is the Coast Guard which
should be considered the primary federal regulatory authority.
2) Executive Order #12612 on 'Federalism'
The actual effect of federal authority in resolving the
anchoring conflict is questionable. This is due to the
restrictions placed on the preemptive powers of all federal
agencies through Executive Order 12612, of October 26,
1987. 1 67 This order mandates that all federal agencies are
to avoid using their preemptive power over state and local
government action. Under this Order, federal agencies may only
preempt where a federal statute contains an express preemption
provision, or where it can be clearly proven that Congress had
intended to so preempt. 168 As neither courts nor
legislators have officially associated a federal preemptive
intent with laws which regulate anchoring, federal agencies
have no cause to use their preemptive powers over state
anchoring laws.
167 Executive Order 12612, "Federalism", Oct. 26, 1987.
168 Id.
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C. The Coast Guard Legal Opinion
On January 19th, 1993, the Chief of the Coast Guard's
Maritime and International Law Division released a memorandum
which defined the Coast Guard's position towards anchorage
policy. 169 The memorandum described the results of an
eleven month legal review of the anchoring conflict. The legal
review came as a result of a request from the Boat Owners
Association of the united states (BOAT/US).170
The results of the Coast Guard's legal investigation were
mixed; siding on the behalf of the states on some points,
while also recognizing the constitutional right of the public
to enjoy free navigation. Ultimately, although willing to
provide a legal opinion on the matter, the Coast Guard has
refused to monitor the constitutionality of state laws, or
take any type of legal action against states.
In undertaking the legal study, the Law Division of the
Coast Guard was asked to assess questions from three broad
areas. The areas under question were: (1) to define the limits
on state regulation of anchoring in the navigable waters of
the United states; (2) to assess whether state regulation of
169 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 1.
170 Flannery, "Decision disappoints anchorage rights
groups", Soundings, March, 1993: A4. BOAT/US is one of the
lobbying groups involved in the anchoring conflict.
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navigation unduly interferes with the pUblic right to
navigate, and; (3) exactly when may the Coast Guard act to
ensure freedom of navigation in the navigable waters of the
united states. 171 These broad question areas were
subsequently broken down into five specific questions, which
were answered in the memorandum. The five specific questions
appeared as follows:
1. What are the limits on state regulation over
anchoring?172
2. Are the states preempted from regulating anchoring on
the navigable waters of the United states?173
3. Is state regulation of navigation and anchoring
limited by the application of the 'dormant' commerce
clause of the United states Constitution?174
4. Can state regulation of anchoring and navigation
constitute an undue restriction of a boater's right of
free navigation?175
5. Assuming that a state scheme of regulation over
navigable waters of the United states has either run
afoul of a conflicting federal statute or improperly
interferes with interstate commerce, what is the
obligation of the Coast Guard, representing the federal
171 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 1. The original "call of the
question" was much more broad, and the question areas
represent a revised list of the material originally
requested by BOAT/US. The Coast Guard worked only with the
revised list.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 2.
174 Id. at 5.
175 Id. at 6.
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government, to resolve the conflict?176
In addressing the first question, the Coast Guard
concluded that the states enjoy a concurrent authority with
the federal government over navigable waters of the United
States, within their respective borders. This concurrent
authority comes as a result of a state's inherent police
powers "to prescribe, within limits of the state and federal
constitutions, reasonable regUlations necessary to preserve
the pUblic order, health, safety and morals. ,,177
The exercise of state police power is limited in two
ways. First, if Congress enacts a federal statute that
conflicts with state law, federal law preempts the conflicting
state law. Second, that the exercise of state regUlatory
authority is directly limited by powers reserved to the
federal government because of the "exclusive nature of
congressional authority to regulate interstate
comrnerce.,,178 This congressional authority has sometimes
been referred to as a "dominant servitude" or a "superior
navigation easement" .179 Within this study, it is referred
to as the "navigation servitude". The navigation servitude
176 Id. at 7.
177 Id. at 1. See also 16A Am. Jur. 2d.,
"Constitutional Law", (1979): 366.
178 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. State
RegUlation", Dec. 30, 1993: 2.
179 rd.
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enables federal authority to supersede state regulations where
such regulations might unduly burden interstate commerce, and
is applicable even where congress fails to act. 18 0 The
Coast Guard authorities found that the states may regulate
anchoring in their respective waters as a legitimate exercise
of their police powers, provided that such regulations do not
go beyond either limitation on state power. 181
The second question taken into account in the Coast
Guard's legal study deals with the issue of whether the states
are preempted from regulating anchoring on the navigable
waters of the united states. In addressing this issue, the
Coast Guard pointed out that the Supreme Court has
traditionally fashioned a two-tier analysis thereof. First,
state law is preempted if Congress either expl icitly or
implicitly evidences an intent to exclusively occupy a given
field. 182 Second, even if Congress has not entirely
displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state
law is still preempted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. In other words, when it is
impossible to accommodate both state and federal law, or where
a state law may stand as an obstacle "to the accomplishment of
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. In undertaking this analysis, it must also be
assumed that the historic police powers of the states were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act, unless that was the
clear intent of Congress. (Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
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the full purposes and objectives of Congress", state law is
preempted by federal authority. 183 These preemptive
stipulations are further restricted by Executive Order 12612
of October 26, 1987, which suggests that preemption of state
law is to be applied jUdiciously in dealing with the states,
and that federal agencies are to avoid direct, overbearing
confrontation. 184
The Coast Guard found that Congress has not demonstrated
an express or implied intent to preempt state regulation of
anchorages. 185 Congress has, however, established an
extensive scheme of federal regulations over navigation and
navigable waterways. In general, courts which have considered
the matter (of anchorages) have generally concluded that
Congress has not pervaded the field, leaving quite a few areas
open to state regulation. 18 6 In fact, Congress has not only
183 Id. at 3. Also see Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v.
state Energy commission, 461 U.S. 191, 103 S.ct. 1713,
(1983) •
184 Executive Order #12612, "Federalism", October 26,
1987 sets forth guidelines regarding the relationship
between federal agencies and the states. Although it
suggests that federal preemption is to be avoided or handled
judiciously, preemption is not prohibited where state action
clearly conflicts with agency policy and actions. Id.
185 In the context of this point, it must be noted that
there is a clear distinction between "anchorages", which is
the SUbject of discussion in the immediate context, and
"anchoring", which mayor may not be an act of navigation.
186 In Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991), the
U.s. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a
city ordinance enacted by the city of Santa Barbara,
affecting vessel moorings was not preempted. The ordinance
required vessels to obtain permission to moor or anchor in a
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failed to pervade the field, but on the contrary has expressly
encouraged the individual states to take a more active role
through the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).187
In particular, Congress found that it was the national policy
to "encourage the states to balance competing interests among
industry, national defense,
energy".188
recreation, fisheries, and
In analyzing the question of whether a state law
conflicts with federal statutes, the Coast Guard points out
that some observers have cited 33 U.S.C. 471 and 33 C.F.R.
Part 109 as providing the basis for federal preemption of
state regulation of anchorage. 18 9 The statute, 33 U.S.C.
471, gives the Coast Guard the authority to establish
anchorage grounds in the navigable waters of the united states
designated area, and forbade anchorage in another. The court
held that although federal law regulates much of the
activity on or near navigable waterways, it does not
entirely exclude state or local governments from
supplementing federal regUlations. In reaching its decision,
the court looked at specific regUlations cited by the
plaintiffs. These regulations were the Ports and waterways
Safety Act, s 4, as amended (33 U.S.C.A. s 1223); 33 C.F.R.
165, on special anchorage area regUlations; and 33 C.F.R.
110, on security zone regUlations. The plaintiffs failed to
make any reference to the commerce clause, navigation
servitude, or historical public trust rights, which, if
employed may have had a significant bearing on the court's
decision.
187 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. State
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 4. Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.
188 Id. See also 16 U.S.C. at 1452 (b).
189 Id. at 5.
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whenever such anchorage grounds are in the best maritime or
commercial interests of the nation to carry out safe
navigation. 190 In practice, however, the regulations
promulgated under this authority do not establish a pervasive
system of federal regulation over anchorage. Likewise, federal
law enables the Coast Guard to establish "special anchorage
areas", where vessels of less than 65 feet in length may
anchor and are not required to display anchor lights and
shapes, which are ordinarily required. 191 As long as a
state does not purport to regulate the display of lights and
shapes within one of those such "special anchorage areas", it
may enact anchorage regulations without SUbjecting itself to
federal preemption.
The third question addressed by the Coast Guard in their
legal study deals with state regulation of navigation and
anchoring being possibly limited by the application of the
~ commerce clause of the Constitution. In addressing this
question, the Coast Guard first established that Supreme Court
findings suggest that the federal government has the exclusive
right to regulate navigation, however the Court also
recognizes that the states have a wide scope for regulating
matters of local nature which may affect interstate
190 Id.
191 Id.
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commerce. 192
The Coast Guard's review of court interpretations of the
commerce clause and navigational rights revealed mixed
results. While some court findings hold that the commerce
clause is inapplicable to recreational boating, others concede
that laws which prohibit temporary mooring or anchoring of a
vessel within township waters are in conflict with the
commerce clause, and thus inapplicable. 193 In summing up
this issue, the Coast Guard noted that the Supreme court has
invalidated state laws under the commerce clause only when
they fall into three general categories: (A) laws that
192 In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9wheat) 1 (1824), the
Supreme court suggested that the federal government had the
exclusive right to regulate navigation. In Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), the Supreme Court
recognized that states may not regulate SUbjects which,
because of the need for national uniformity, demand that
their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single
authority. The Court went on to conclude that state
regulation affecting interstate commerce would be upheld if
the regulatory burden imposed on interstate commerce was
outweighed by the state interest in enforcing the
regulation. This finding may serve to grant the states
considerable authority under their police powers to enact
regulations that impact navigable waters. Id. at 5.
193 In Rentner v. Village of Burnham, 82 Ill. 1175
(1984), boat owners were fighting a mooring fee charged by
the local government. The court held that the commerce
clause was inapplicable to recreational boating in the
immediate context, because the boaters did not cross state
lines. In Bass River Associates v. Mayor of Bass River, 743
F.2d 159 (3rd Cir 1984), the court held that a township's
prohibition of floating homes was not preempted by federal
regulations, however also concluded that the township could
not prohibit temporary mooring or anchoring of a vessel
within townShip waters. The court did not establish any
guidelines which would define exactly how long "temporary"
anchoring or mooring might be.
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arbitrarily or purposefully discriminate against interstate
commerce in favor of in-state interests; (B) laws which impose
incidental burdens on interstate and foreign commerce that are
clearly excessive in comparison to the local benefits, and (C)
laws which serve to undermine the federal need for uniformity
among states in particular areas, such as interstate
transportation and foreign trade. 194
In analyzing the fourth question, the Coast Guard took
into account the regulation of anchoring and navigation as an
undue restriction of a boater's right of free navigation. This
question provided a relatively favorable outcome on the behalf
of boaters and those who do not support anchoring
restrictions.
The Coast Guard found that a state cannot completely bar
the passage of a vessel through concurrent state and federal
waters. 19 5 Likewise, they provided evidence that the right
of navigation includes, as a necessary incident, the right of
anchorage19 6 and that a vessel anchored for up to two years
194 Coast Guard Memo #16501, Dec. 30, 1992: 6.
195 Id at 6. Any navigable waters within state
boundaries are SUbject to both state and federal authority.
In Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265, 97 S.ct. 1740
(1977), the court held that the barring of a -v e s s e l through
concurrent state and federal waters would likely violate the
indisputable precept that no state may exclude federally
licensed commerce.
196 Kuramo v. Hamada. 30 Haw. 841 (1929).
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can still be found to be "in navigation".197 The memorandum
went on to state that "any state regulation narrowly
restricting a vessel anchoring in state waters, even on a long
term basis, may well be an unreasonable ban on the right of
free navigation within joint state and federal waters" .198
Case law, however, is "unhelpfully silent on this particular
issue".199
In examining the final question, regarding the statutory
obligation of the Coast Guard, representing the federal
government, to resolve the anchoring conflict, the legal study
concluded that the Coast Guard has no statutory obligation to
monitor the constitutionality of state laws, or take legal
action against a state. 200 Furthermore, the Coast Guard "is
under no affirmative duty to aid private citizens who believe
a state is treading upon a federally preempted right". 201
The Coast Guard authorities also bear mention of Executive
Order #12612,202 which mandates that all federal agencies
197 In U.S. v. Monstad, 134 F.2d 986 (9th Cir 1943),
the court found that a barge anchored in one position for
more than two years without getting underway was "in
navigation:. Id.
198 Id.
199 dI .
200 Id. See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470, U.S. 821, 838
(1985) .
201 dI • at 7.
202 Executive Order #12612, "Federalism", Oct. 26,
1987.
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are to avoid asserting their preemptive powers over state and
local government action. The Order allows preemption claims
only where a federal statute contains an express provision, or
where there is evidence that Congress intended to so
preempt. 203
203 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 7.
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CHAPrER IV: THE TEST CASE
A. HNWPS v. Hawaii
1) Background of the Case
During the late summer months of 1992, the conflicting
interests between state offices concerned with the regulation
of vessels within state waters, and boater interest groups
concerned with securing a declaration of a fundamental right
to anchor became the basis of a legal confrontation. This
confrontation eventually materialized into the case known as
Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Society v. state of
Hawaii,204 (HNWPS v. Hawaii). The plaintiff, Hawaiian
Navigable Waters Preservation Society (the Preservation
Society), is a non-profit corporation whose immediate interest
was to stay the enforcement of, if not overturn, Hawaiian laws
which were enacted in order to regulate both mooring and
anchoring. 205
Act 379 of the 1988 Hawaiian Session Laws, provided the
Hawaii Department of Transportation with the authority to
regulate both anchoring and mooring of vessels within the
204 Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Society v.
State of Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993).
205 dI .
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state's navigable ocean waters, and navigable streams. 206
In 1991, some jurisdictional authority over recreational
boating was transferred to the Department of Land and Natural
Resources (DLNR).207
In 1991, the Hawaii Department of Transportation,
pursuant to its authority under the Hawaii Administrative
Procedures Act,208 adopted similar rules regulating
anchoring and mooring in state waters (Appendix).209
Subsequently, the Department of transportation was issued a
federal permit for the installation of approximately 360
moorings at Ke'ehi Lagoon. 210 Prior to the grant of
permission for the installation of moorings, Ke' ehi lagoon had
been established as a special federal anchorage zone. 211
206 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 379, 1988.
207 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 272, 1991.
208 Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act, Haw. Revised
Statutes, 91-1, et seq.
209 Id. Hawaii Administrative Rules regulates small
boat harbors.
210 Ke'ehi Lagoon is located on the island of Oahu,
almost directly between Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. Ironicly,
it is also located relatively close to Kuapa Pond and the
Hawaii-Kai marina, which are to the east of Honolulu. Kuapa
Pond was the area in question in Kaiser Aetna.
211 As mentioned previously in the chapter regarding
the Coast Guard legal review, 33 C.F.R. establishes two
broad classes of anchorage regulations: special anchorage
areas (Subpart A) and anchorage grounds (Subpart B). The
waters of Ke'ehi Lagoon fall under the regulatory
stipulations of SUbpart A, which states:
liThe areas described in SUbpart A of this part are
designated as special anchorage areas pursuant to the
authority contained in an act amending laws for preventing
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Essentially, this allows vessels 65 feet or less in length to
anchor without being required to display a white light,
indicating that such vessel is at anchor. It also indicates
that the Coast Guard extended regulatory authority over Ke'ehi
lagoon. Apparently, this extension of federal authority was
thought by the plaintiffs to supercede all state regulations,
and was subsequently one of their points of contention.
In commencing legal action, the Preservation Society
sought to challenge the constitutionality of all Hawaii
regulations and legislation affecting the rights of mariners
to navigate and anchor in the ocean waters surrounding the
islands of Hawaii. They contended that such regulations are
constitutionally infirm, and further argued that Congress has
both exclusive jurisdictional control over such matters, and
has explicitly and implicitly preempted Hawaii's comprehensive
regulatory regime. 212 In formulating their argument, the
Preservation Society based their suppositions on the federal
preemptive authority established through the retention of the
navigation servitude in the Submerged Lands Act,213 the
scheme of special federal anchorage grounds established
pursuant to 33 U. S . C., Section 471, and federal safety
collisions of vessels ....Vessels not more than 65 feet in
length, when at anchor in any special anchorage shall not be
required to carry or exhibit the white anchor lights
required by the navigation rules". 33 C.F.R Sect. 110.1 (A).
212 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 4.
213 Id. See also SUbmerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.
at 1301.
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regulations also set forth in 33 u.s.c., Section 1602. 21 4
Additionally, the Preservation Society contended that the
regulations act was an unconstitutional restriction on
interstate commerce. 215
In evaluating the case, the District Court was of the
opinion that the parties involved had submitted matters beyond
the scope of the pleadings, and therefore would only entertain
motions for summary judgement, rather than judgement on the
pleadings. 21 6 By entering into summary judgement, the court
was able to evaluate the points of contention without the
necessity of having the case heard by a jury. Also, as the
case was a statutory review, a decision reached through
summary judgement would enable the plaintiffs to bring the
matter before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, in San
Francisco, California. 217
214 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. SUpp. 766 (1993): 4.
215 dI .
216 Rule 56(C) of the Federal Rules of civil Procedure
provides that summary jUdgement shall be entered when:
" ... the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and the admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a jUdgement as a matter of law."
The moving party has the burden of identifying for the
court, those portions of the materials on file that it
believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact. Id.
217 Telephone interview with Morgan J.C. Scudi, Huth,
Farmer & Scudi, 5440 Morehouse Dr., suite 4400, San Diego,
CA, 29121, (619) 58-1001, March 18, 1994. Through the
telephone interview, Mr. Scudi indicated that the purpose of
entering into summary judgement was that since this was a
80
2) The Findings of the Court
In examining the case, the court first undertook to
define the ways in which state laws might be subject to
federal preemption. It defined this by looking at the
precedent set by three prior cases: Beveridge v. Lewis,218
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 219 and Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator corp.220
In Beveridge, the issue at hand was similar to that being
examined in HNWPS v. Hawaii. There, the court sustained the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance enacted by the city
of Santa Barbara restricting both mooring and anchoring within
the city harbor during the winter months. In rejecting the
contention that the ordinance was preempted by the Ports and
waterways safety Act221 the court adopted the analysis for
preemption which had been previously set forth in Ray. There,
the court began its analysis with the reminder that prior
cases have indicated that when a State's exercise of police
statutory review, their goal was to both have the district
court pass jUdgment on the legal contentions, and be able to
get the case appealed in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Mr. Scudi also indicated that he was of the mind that, based
on its arguments, this case would be decided in favor of the
State of Hawaii.
218 Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991).
219 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
220 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1950) .
221 Ports and waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. 1221, et
seq.
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power is challenged as being preempted by federal authority,
"we start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the state were not superseded by the Federal Act, unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of congress.,,222 It
then went on to explain that Congressional purpose may be
evidenced in several ways; the scheme of federal regulation
may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it, or the
Act of Congress may touch upon a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will' be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. 223 Thus, the court employed these two measures as
their guidelines by which to determine federal preemption.
In charging that the Hawaiian statutes were sUbject to
federal preemption through the SUbmerged Lands Act, the
Preservation Society invoked Section 1311 (b) of the Act,
which reads:
The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto
said States and persons aforesaid, except as otherwise
reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of the
United States, if any it has, in and to all said lands,
improvements, and natural resources .... Nothing in this
sUbchapter ... shall affect the use, development,
improvement, or control by . .. the United States of
said ...waters for the purposes of navigation .... 224
222 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993). Quoting
Rice.
223 Id. at 4.
224 Id.
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The plaintiffs argued that the provision, a retention of
the navigation servitude, is an expression of Congress' intent
to retain exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting
navigation. The District Court, however, was of the opinion
that the contention was without merit, and went on to state
that the provisions did not offer any indication that Congress
intended to retain exclusive, rather than concurrent
jurisdiction over navigable waters of the states. 225 The
court stated that:
No court has read section 1311 (b) as a manifestation of
Congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
regulation of navigable waters. This is because there is
no reason to suspect that the section is any more than an
expression of the well-established proposition that the
federal government retains a paramount navigation
servitude in the waters of the states .•.. The retention of
this servitude does not, as plaintiffs suggest, mean that
the federal government has exclusive control over state
waters. All the retention of the servitude means is that
the government may, without payin~ compensation, decrease
the value of riparian property.2 6
The court interpreted the facts to mean that the
225 Id. The court stated that "Normally, if the
language of a statute is unambiguous, its plain meaning
controls." this plain language reading is supported by the
legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act as well: the
House Committee reporting on the SUbmerged Lands Act stated:
" ... The bill provides that, except to the extent that
it is exercised in a manner inconsistent with applicable
federal laws, the police power of each coastal state may
extend to that portion of the continental shelf which would
be within the boundaries of such state if extended seaward
to the outer margin of the shelf." H. Rep. No. 215, 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953).
226 Id.
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preemptive effect of the navigation servitude can be no
greater than that of the commerce clause, from which it
originates. Thus, federal action taken pursuant to the
navigation servitude preempts state legislation only if such
legislation is implicitly or explicitly preempted, or in
conflict with federal law. 227 The court found no explicit
or implicit conflicts to exist between the Submerged Lands Act
and the Hawaiian anchoring regulations, thus by itself, the
SUbmerged Lands Act could not sustain a claim of preemption.
The second point brought up by the Preservation Society
was that of federal preemption under the provisions of the
special federal anchorage area in Ke' ehi Lagoon. 228 Their
contention here was that the establishment of a special
federal anchorage area is indicative of Congress' extension of
authority over the area, and that as such, additional state
regulations are inherently preempted. In a related argument,
the plaintiffs claimed that the Coast Guard's allowance of
regulatory action within the lagoon by the state constitutes
an impermissible delegation of power. 229
As previously stated, the Coast Guard has Congressional
authority to establish two broad classes of anchorage areas.
Namely, these are special anchorage areas, and anchorage
grounds. Designation of waters as a special anchorage area
227 Id.
228 Id. at 8.
229 Id.
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allows vessels 65 feet and under the privilege of anchoring
without the necessity of displaying anchor lights. 230
Designation of waters as an anchorage ground establishes such
area as a mooring or anchoring field. As such, it might appear
on a nautical chart as "anchorage", or moorings may be placed
there pursuant to obtaining a permit for such. 231 As
explained in the Coast Guard legal opinion, the state is
allowed to exercise its police powers over such areas, as long
as the provisions of such powers do not conflict with federal
law. 232
The court found that there was no actual conflict between
state and federal regulation in Ke I ehi Lagoon, as state
regulations did not purport to impose anchor-light regulations
on vessels less than 65 feet in length in the lagoon. 233
The court drew reference to the Coast Guard legal opinion in
stating that local governments may establish, maintain and
charge reasonable fees for mooring within a federally
designated special anchorage area. 234
In assessing the Preservation Society I s argument that the
Coast Guard's allowance of state regulation within the
230 33 C.F.R., Sect. 109.10.
231 Id. at SUbpart (b).
232 Coast Guard Memorandum, #16501, "Federal vs. State
Jurisdiction", Dec. 30, 1992: 5.
233 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 9.
234 Id. Referring to Coast Guard Memorandum, #16501,
"Federal vs. State Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992.
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designated special anchorage area was an impermissible
redelegation of authority to the state of Hawaii, the court
responded by stating that it could not clearly comprehend the
argument. 235 It did state, however, that there was no
evidence that the Coast Guard abandoned its regulatory
authority. 236
The assumption to be made here is that the Preservation
society believed that by allowing any additional state
regulatory stipulations to be enacted within the special
anchorage area, the Coast Guard was ignoring its regulatory
authority. This assumption is supported by a letter issued by
the Coast Guard to the Key West Port and Transit Authority:
Establishing the special anchorage zone places no
obligation for mariners to anchor within it. Mariners are
free to anchor anywhere in navigable waters where the act
of anchoring is not prohibited by federal regulation.
Similarly, vessels anchoring within the anchorage zone
will not be obliged to use the installed moorings. You
may collect a fee from those who choose to use your
moorings, but the mariner is entitled to use an anchor at
no fee and stay in the anchorage zone an indefinite
period. These federal anchorage rights preempt any state
or local statutes or regulations which may conflict with
them. 237
The statement refers to federal preemption, and seems to
imply that the Coast Guard, as an arm of the federal
235 Id. at 10.
236 dI .
237 Chief, Seventh Coast Guard Dist., Letter to
Director, Port and Transit Authority of Key West, # 16612,
Sere 1389, Nov. 21, 1991: 1.
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government, may extend their power of preemption where
additional laws are enacted in special anchorage areas. No
reference to the preceding statement was ever made in HNWPS v
Hawaii. It does, however, represent a valid point which was
never raised in the case. Court documents, as well as
telephone interviews, did not indicate that the plaintiffs
were aware of the existence of the Coast Guard statement. This
may account for it not being raised as an argument within the
case.
The statement is also significant in that it conveys a
much stronger opinion on anchoring rights than the more recent
Coast Guard legal opinion, discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.
Coast Guard statements which were released prior to the point
at which anchoring laws were first challenged in the federal
court system (marked by the first stage of HNWPS v. Hawaii),
generally take a more assertive view than those which were
sUbsequently written. This is evidenced by the following two
opinions released in 1981:
The Coast Guard also administers anchorage regulations on
the navigable waters of the united states. In order for
states and local governments to establish and regulate
anchorage areas, ~ermission must first be obtained from
the Coast Guard. 2 8
Lt. Griesbaum [indicated that town officials] in Indian
Harbour Beach had absolutely no authority in the waterway
area concerned, that the U. s. Code gave Coast Guard
238 R.C. Branham, Commander, Seventh Coast Guard
District, Letter #16753/1 to Paula Hawkins, united states
Senate, June 22, 1981.
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exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of anchoring in
navigable waters. The Coast Guard, in turn, promulgated
regulations now in the Code of Federal Regulations. The
Coast Guard has not and will not delegate their authority
to anyone. However, Griesbaum said we would not get a
written answer from the Admiral commanding 7th District
because of the helpful and extensive cooperation the
Coast Guard gets and must have from the state, County and
Municipal authorities in the matter of speed limits,
pollution, illegal netting, boat inspections and
registrations, and other law enforcement functions in the
waterway areas which the Coast Guard simply cannot meet
alone. 239
The shift in assertive opinions may be best explained
through the following Coast Guard memorandum, released in
1992:
The title and opening paragraph of the article [reference
to article in "Boaters' Monthly", Feb. 1992] suggest that
the Coast Guard will take a proactive legal role to keep
states or municipalities from enacting or keeping
anchorage regulations. That is not the case. If a
conflict is shown to exist between federal law and state
or local anchoring regulations, then you are correct in
stating that federal law will prevail. However, the Coast
Guard has taken a long-standing policy of not commenting
on the legality of state or local regulations if there is
no direct conflict with federal law or regulations
administered by the Coast Guard. No existing federal
statute or court decision definitively states that local
anchorage regulations - even those prohibiting anchoring
- exceed the states' authority to exercise their police
powers. Therefore, the courts, not the Coast Guard, must
rule that a conflict exist[s] before federal preemption
can occur. 24 0
239 John Barnett, Office of the Florida state Attorney,
Memorandum addressed to W.J. Patterson, March 20, 1981.
240 R.D. Peterson, Seventh Coast Guard District,
Memorandum #16617 to Valerie Jones, Concerned Boaters, March
6, 1992.
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Here, Coast Guard opinions more closely reflect those of
the legal opinion described in Chapter 3. As there are no
documents which definitively state the reasons for a change in
the assertive character of Coast Guard opinions, the
conclusion to be drawn here is that the Coast Guard is acting
within the policy of "not commenting on the legality of state
or local regulations where there is no direct conflict with
federal law or regulations administered by the Coast Guard".
As the anchoring conflict is currently under the jUdicial
scrutiny of the federal courts, and no federal statute
expressly states that the individual states may not regulate
anchoring, the legality of such laws is still questionable,
and a firm statement by the Coast Guard could potentially bias
the opinions of the courts.
The next argument brought to consideration by the court
was that of the Hawaiian regulations being too narrow in scope
to allow for an acceptable degree of vessel safety. In support
of their argument, the plaintiffs cited 33 C.F.R. section
2030. 241 This section provides in part that:
A vessel at anchor shall exhibit where it can best be
seen:
(i) in the fore part, an all-around white light or one
ball; and
(ii) at or near the stern and at a lower level than the
light prescribed in SUbparagraph (i), an all-around white
241 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 10.
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light. 242
Apparently, the plaintiffs read these regulations to
imply that a vessel would necessarily have to be manned in
order to adequately display such anchor lights, and that
Hawaiian law impinged on this supposition. Section 2030,
however, does not require anchored vessels to be constantly
manned.
The court found that on an ordinary, clear night, the
maintenance of a proper anchor light is the only precaution
necessary to warn other vessels, and as such is the only
requirement which the mariner must meet. 2 4 3 The court
further went on to state that even if federal regulations did
create some duty to maintain an overnight presence on a vessel
at anchor, there is no evidence that this is in conflict with
Hawaiian law. 244 Hawaiian law provides for liveaboard fees
to be paid by individuals using a moored vessel as a place of
principal habitation. 245 As there is no statutory
obligation for one to live aboard one's vessel, the court
reasoned that there is likewise no obligation for the mariner
to pay a liveaboard fee. 2 4 6 Hawaiian regulations do not
242 rd. at 10. citing 33 C.F.R. section 2030.
243 dr .
244 dr .
245 HRS Section 266-21.
246 rd.
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prohibit a person from living aboard a vessel, however they do
establish a scheme of fees to be paid if one chooses to live
aboard a vessel.
In denouncing this contention, the court stated that
" ... the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs indicate nothing
more than the fact that plaintiffs are dissatisfied with
having to pay the mooring fees charged by the state of
Hawaii. ,,247
Next, the court undertook to examine the question of
implicit federal preemption through the sources cited by the
plaintiffs. Again, relying heavily on Beveridge, the court
noted that:
Just because Congress has intended to reduce the
possibility of cargo and vessel loss, prevent damage to
structures on or near navigable waters, ensure that
vessels comply with certain standards, and just because
it believes that navigation and vessel safety and
protection of the marine environment are matters of major
national importance does not mean that the [state] is
completely trammeled in all regulatory efforts. 248
The court went on to state that although it is undisputed
that the Secretary of Transportation and the Coast Guard have
extensive authority to regulate anchoring, mooring and the
movement of vessels, these powers are discretionary. The
authorities may act to affect any of the afore-mentioned
247 dI .
248 Id. at 11. Noting that which was found in
Beveridge.
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navigational issues, but they are not required to do so. Thus,
the court concluded that the Submerged Lands Act and the
provisions cited within 33 U.S.C. do not implicitly preempt
the regulatory scheme of Hawaiian anchorage laws.
Finally, the court took into consideration the argument
that Hawaiian regulations act as an unconstitutional
restriction on interstate commerce. The Preservation Society
had asserted that all vessels entering Hawaii are engaged in
interstate commerce. Although they cited no authority, it may
be presumed that their contention was based on the fact that
travel to the state of Hawaii necessitates passage over the
high seas, and likewise, travel among the islands also
periodically requires passage over the high seas. Typically,
the federal government is the regUlatory authority over
transportation over the high seas. The court found no evidence
to indicate that Hawaiian anchorage laws act as an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. This is
primarily because the plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence
which would support such an argument.
In reaching this decision, the court first cited a
previous Hawaiian case, Matson Navigation v. Hawaii Pub. Utile
Comm.,249 in which the court held that the State of Hawaii
may regulate transportation among the islands, as long as such
regUlations are not in conflict with any existing federal
249 Matson Navigation v. Hawaii Pub. Utile Comm., 742
F. Supp. 1468, 1484 (D. Haw. 1990).
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regulations. 25 0 Although the court also recognized that
Congress has the power, under the commerce clause, to regulate
commerce involving navigable and international waters (high
seas), this power does not preclude the state of Hawaii from
regulating commerce between places within the state solely
because it involves such waters. The court stated that:
To hold that the state of Hawaii may not regulate
transportation between islands, even where there is no
federal regulation, merely because such transportation
passes over the high seas, would in effect place Hawaii
on a different footing than the rest of the states in the
union. It would also create an anomalous situation where
such shipping and shippers would in fact be wholly
unregulated to the severe detriment of the people of
Hawaii. 251
Although the court conceded that the instant regulations
may act to create an indirect burden on interstate commerce by
regulating the mooring of vessels that at some time originated
out of the state, such regulation is "permissible if the state
regulates evenhandedly, has a legitimate interest, and the
local benefits outweigh the burden on interstate
commerce". 25 2 As the Preservation Society produced no
evidence showing that the state had regulated mooring or
anchoring in an unreasonable manner, the court found their
argument without merit.
250 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. SUpp. 766 (1993).
251 Id. at 13.
252 Id.
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Thus, the court upheld the authority of the state in
imposing the noted restrictions on vessels within its
navigable waters:
The court finds that the state of Hawaii has a legitimate
interest in insuring the safe use of ports by
recreational boaters and that the contested regulations
are rationally related to this objective. HRS Sections
200-4 and 200-6 were established to avoid conflicting
uses between recreational ocean users and vessels
conducting passive mooring and anchoring activities. The
state concluded that such conflicting uses posed a
substantial threat to public safety because of the heavy
water traffic at Ke'ehi Lagoon. The court finds that this
response was not irrational. 253
The court likewise would not grant the plaintiffs'
request to stay the enforcement of the Hawaiian laws until
such time as the matter would be heard before the Court of
Appeals. 254 As of the time when this research was
undertaken and the results printed, the case was pending
appeal in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco,
California and no hearing date had yet been determined. 255
253 dI . at 14.
254 In order for a court to grant a motion to stay
enforcement of laws pending a legal review, the moving party
must be able to show (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the
existence of serious questions going to the merits and the
balance of hardships tipping in its favor. The court was not
of the opinion that the forthcoming legal appeal would
satisfy either of these requirements. Id. at 15-16.
255 Telephone conversation with agent in charge of
docketing, San Francisco Cir. ct. of App., March 29, 1994.
94
B. Review of HNWPS v. Hawaii
In HNWPS v. Hawaii, the logic which was used by the court
to arrive at conclusions seems to have been correctly
employed; the court made reasonable conclusions based on the
material which was presented by the parties involved.
Ordinarily, such means of passing jUdgement would be
satisfactory. Specific statutes, legal and historical
doctrines, and case history may be available to provide the
court with a clear set of guidelines to follow when
interpreting a conflict, comparing it to others, and
ultimately reaching conclusions. Thus, legal conclusions may
be reached by repeatedly casting one's bucket into the well of
existing knowledge. with regard to the anchoring conflict,
however, the well of knowledge is surprisingly shallow. Very
little case history exists which would aid legal interpreters
in being able to reach conclusions based on prior fact, and
the body of legislative coverage is commonly held to be
piecemeal at best. 256 In reviewing HNWPS v. Hawaii, the
court may have correctly interpreted the letter of the law,
where such letter was provided, however the review may also
have been too narrow in scope to correctly evaluate the spirit
256 Elaine Dickinson, Assistant Vice President of
Boat/U.S. Telephone Interview of March 16, 1994. Ms.
Dickinson's views of a "piecemeal" legislative body are
descriptive of the views of most of the parties with whom
the researcher has likewise conversed.
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question was not established by the Coast Guard as a security
zone. 261 Thus, the immediate laws may be seen as the city's
exercise of police power in promoting what it believes to be
the public good.
As in HNWPS v. Hawaii, the plaintiffs were a group of
owners of boats which were either anchored or moored within
the prohibited area. Likewise, they sued the city for
injunctive relief based on the premise that the regulations
were preempted by federal law. 2 62 The court dismissed
charges of federal preemption, and upheld the validity of the
city ordinance. 2 63 The validity of the court's decision may
be questioned, however, when compared to a similar, more
recent ruling handed down by a Florida circuit court. This
ruling overturned a local ordinance which, like the Santa
Barbara ordinance, allowed anchoring in an area at certain
times, yet prohibited it during others. 2 64
At the heart of the Florida case was a challenge to a
park ordinance, enacted in the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State
Park, prohibiting anchoring at night. The regulations were
enacted to prevent environmental damage: specifically damage
261 Id.
262 In addressing the question of federal preemption,
the plaintiffs based their argument primarily on preemption
under the Ports and waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C.A. ss
1221 et. seq. Id. at 1.
263 Id.
264 Boat US Reports, "Judge Throws Out Anchoring
Restriction", Vol. XXIX, Jan. 1994: 3.
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public safety.269 However, in neither instance do the case
reports indicate that these assertions were substantiated by
fact. This would indicate that the court's decisions may have
been flawed.
While the plaintiffs in HNWPS v. Hawaii sought to
challenge the constitutionality of all Hawaiian anchorage
laws, the only ones which were examined by the court were HRS
200-4 and HRS 200-62 7 0• Ignored by the court were other
laws, which may contradict some of the legal findings in the
immediate case. 27 1 One law of concern is HRS 266-21, which
provides:
(1) No more than fifteen percent of the respective total
moorage space available .•• at the Ala Wai and Ke'ehi boat
harbors [be available] for liveaboard purposes.
(2) [permit application, mooring and liveaboard fees]
shall be higher for non-residents [of the state of
269 In HNWPS v. Hawaii, the court stated that:
" ...Hawaii has a legitimate interest in insuring the safe
use of ports by recreational boaters and that the contested
regulations are rationally related to this objective... [the
ordinances] were established to avoid conflicting uses
between 'recreational ocean users and vessels conducting
passive mooring and anchoring activities." HNWPS v. Hawaii,
823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 14. Although the court cites the
reasons for the enactment of the ordinances under question,
nowhere in the case report is there evidence that the state
provided proof to SUbstantiate these assertions. Likewise,
in Beveridge v. Lewis, the case report indicates that the
ordinance under question was enacted largely lito protect
[the waterfront facilities] from possible damage." Beveridge
v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991): 29. Again, nowhere in the
report is there proof to substantiate the assertion.
270 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F.Supp. 766 (1993).
271 The court did not examine Haw. Rev. stat. 266-21.1-
3.
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a common law right of access to the ocean. Although they did
not argue their case as one involving the public trust
doctrine, the court supplied the view that the "pUblic trust
doctrine dictates that a beach and ocean waters must be open
to all on equal terms and without preference and that any
contrary state or municipal action is impermissible.,,275
Likewise, in a similar New Jersey case, Brindley v.
Borough of Lavalette,276 the court held that the borough,
by maintaining a boardwalk, pavilions, and bathing facilities,
had acquired a public easement for recreational purposes by
adverse users. Thus, an ordinance discriminating against non-
residents was held void. 277
In HNWPS v. Hawaii, the court "relied very heavily on the
Coast Guard [legal] opinion" in drawing many of its
conclusions. 278 One of the provisions of the Coast Guard
legal opinion is a section which delineates under what
circumstances the Supreme Court has previously invalidated
state laws through the power of the commerce clause. Included
in these circumstances are "laws which purposefully or
arbitrarily discriminate against interstate commerce in favor
275 dI . at 47.
276 Brindlev v. Borough of Lavalette, 33 N.J. Super.
344 (1954).
277 Id.
278 Flannery, "Judge upholds Hawaii anchoring law",
Soundings, May, 1993: A8. Quoting Katherine Bell-Moss,
attorney for the Preservation Society from San Diego.
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attorneys involved in challenging anchoring laws, and has also
organized a battery of attorneys currently working on a
voluntary basis on HNWPS v. Hawaii.
A similar conversation with Elaine Dickinson, Assistant
Vice President of Boat/US, a national boater lobby group,
provided additional insights into the absence of the public
trust doctrine in challenging anchoring laws. Dickinson
indicated that her group preferred not to invoke the public
trust, based on it's "nebulous character". She went on to say
that inconsistencies in its interpretation by different courts
could potentially undermine her group's contentions. Likewise,
she pointed out that the inherent cost of bringing a public
trust challenge to trial would be impractical: " ... because of
its nebulous character, a public trust challenge could take
ten years and cost well over a hundred-thousand dollars to
resolve, and even then we're not sure what the outcome will
be. ,,283 Boat/US is the lobby group which was instrumental
in getting the Coast Guard to conduct their legal
investigation into state versus federal regUlation of
anchoring.
283 Telephone interview with Elaine Dickinson,
"Boat/U.s.", March 16, 1994.
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C. The Future of HNWPS v. Hawaii
Thus far, HNWPS v. Hawaii has been heard only at the
district court level. This is representative of the first
stage in a potentially long legal process which could
ultimately result in the case being heard before the Supreme
court of the united States.
Essentially, the united States jUdicial system is a dual-
court system. 284 The Constitution dictates what types of
cases may be heard under the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Included here are admiralty and maritime cases, cases
reviewing the actions of certain federal administrative
agencies, civil suits under federal law, and cases arising
under the Constitution, the laws of the united States, and
treaties. 285 By implication, matters not assigned to the
federal courts through the Constitution are heard in the state
courts. 'Th e question in HNWPS v. Hawaii clearly falls within
the parameters of federal court authority, thus, focus is on
the judicial process of the federal, rather than the state,
jUdicial system.
There are three components of the federal court system,
284 James Wilson, American Government: Institutions and
Policies, Lexington, Mass., 1989: 400.
285 The Constitution of the United States, Article III,
Sept. 17, 1787, and Eleventh Amendment, 1795.
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the first of which is the network of District Courts. There is
one District Court in each of the 94 United states districts,
and these courts are entrusted with original jurisdiction over
matters brought before them. 28 6 District Courts do not have
the power to hear appeals. The immediate case has already been
heard before a District Court.
The second component in the federal court system is the
network of Circuit Courts of Appeals. There are a total of
twelve of these courts, representing each of the eleven
regional circuits, and the District of Columbia. 28 7 Courts
of Appeals hear only appeals from Federal District Courts,
U.s. regulatory commissions, and certain other federal courts.
The majority of cases heard in the Courts of Appeals begin in
the Federal District Courts. 28 8 Currently, HNWPS v. Hawaii
is slated to be heard before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco, California, but as of yet, no
hearing date has been determined. 28 9
The third component in the federal court system is the
Supreme Court of the united States. The Supreme Court may
extend original jurisdiction over cases involving conflicts
between two or more states, the united states and a state,
286 Wilson, American Government, Lexington, 1989: 401.
287 rd.
288 rd. at 40.
289 Telephone Conversation with Clerk's Office, 9th
Cir. ct. of App., San Francisco, Ca., March 30, 1994.
106
foreign ambassadors and other diplomats, and a state bringing
action against a citizen of another state. 29 0 The court
also has, under certain circumstances, appellate jurisdiction
over cases coming from the lower federal courts or the highest
state court. 29 l As HNWPS v. Hawaii is not representative of
an issue over which the Supreme court may extend original
jurisdiction, the only way it may find itself there is through
the court's appellate jurisdiction.
There are essentially two routes by which HNWPS v. Hawaii
may end up in the Supreme Court. One is by an appeal, while
the other is by a writ of certiorari. There are only a few
matters which may qualify for an appeal. In general, these
involve clear constitutional issues, such as when a federal
court has found a federal law to be unconstitutional, or has
found a state law to be in conflict with federal laws or the
constitution, or likewise, when it has upheld a state law
against a claim that it is in violation of a federal law or
the constitution. 292 HNWPS v. Hawaii may clearly qualify
for an appeal under these circumstances.
The more common route to the Supreme Court is through a
writ of certiorari. This is a process by which the court
makes, as the Latin word suggests, an issue "more certain".
This procedure may be invoked when the decision of a Federal
290 wilson, American Government, Lexington, 1989: 401.
291 dI .
292 Id. at 402.
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court of Appeals involves the interpretation of a federal law,
or the constitution. Either side involved in a case may ask
the Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court may use its
discretion in deciding whether or not to grant it. 29 3 As
HNWPS v. Hawaii involves the interpretation of the scope of
the navigation servitude (as set forth in the Submerged Lands
Act), the Supreme Court may be asked to hear the case through
a writ of certiorari.
Although the immediate case does seem to qualify to be
heard before the Supreme Court through both of the appellate
routes, the overall chances of cases making it that far are
quite slim. Only about ten percent of the Supreme Court's
cases arrive by appeal, while roughly ninety-five percent of
the requests for certiorari are rejected. 2 9 4 Likewise, the
costs of having a matter heard in the federal courts are high,
as are the costs of appeal, lawyers fees, certiorari costs,
copies of court records, petitions, and other miscellaneous
matters. The hinderance imposed by cost is compounded by the
amount of time involved in resolving an issue in the federal
courts. Ultimately, although HNWPS v. Hawaii may end up before
the Supreme Court, the process is both long and complex,
ensuring that the issue will not be resolved in any short
period of time.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 402, 403.
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CHAPl'ER V: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Introduction
In review of the data which has been compiled thus far,
it is now possible to begin to analyze the hypotheses
previously delineated in Chapter 1. It is the goal of the
forthcoming chapter to provide the synthesis by which the
relevant data may be used to either support or undermine the
hypotheses. The hypotheses purport that:
1. Anchoring can be proven to be an act of navigation.
2. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in
HNWPS v. Hawaii, unnecessarily restrict interstate
commerce.
3. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in
HNWPS v. Hawaii, unnecessarily restrict pUblic rights
associated with the pUblic trust doctrine.
4. State-imposed anchorage laws which unnecessarily
restrict interstate commerce or pUblic trust rights will
be deemed unconstitutional.
B. Anchoring within the purview of navigation
One of the issues lying at the heart of the anchoring
conflict has to do with the definition of 'navigation', and
more specifically, the relationship of anchoring to that
definition. It has already been established that free
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navigation is ensured under federal protection. The federal
navigation servitude (Chapter II, section B), the offspring of
the commerce clause within the United states Constitution,
gives paramount right to the federal government to compel the
removal of any obstruction to navigation. The navigation
servitude is sUbsequently codified through the Submerged Lands
Act (Chapter III, section A). The Act, though granting
jurisdictional use of said lands to the individual states,
provides that:
The united states retains all of its navigation servitude
and rights in and powers of regulation and control of
said lands for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation~ national defense and international
affairs. 29 :>
Although it has already been established that anchoring
is an activity associated with pUblic trust rights (Chapter
II, section A), anchoring as a right under the pUblic trust
doctrine may be substantially reinforced by its association
with navigation, a more traditional public trust right.
Traditional rights enjoyed by the pUblic in pUblic trust areas
are those of fishing, fowling, navigation and recreation. The
association of public trust rights with anchoring and
navigation shall be discussed at a further stage of the
analysis. At this juncture, it is more important to delineate
exactly how anchoring is an act of navigation, while keeping
in mind the significance of that association with factors such
295 Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C., section
1314 (a).
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as the navigation servitude and public trust doctrine.
In Chapter I, section B, six legal cases are discussed
which both expand the definition of navigation and associate
anchoring with such a definition. These cases are Bowen v.
Hope, The Idaho, Locke v. state, Sayer v. State, United states
v. Monstad, and Kuramo v. Hamada. Each one of these cases is
significant in supporting the premise that anchoring is an act
of navigation. In Bowen, the earliest of the cases, a vessel
anchored while at sea was shown to be engaged in navigation.
The association between anchoring and active navigation was
subsequently echoed in Monstad, wherein a vessel anchored for
a period of more than two years was also held to be in
navigation. Of further importance in Monstad is the fact that
a time-frame was established, during which the vessel never
ceased to be engaged in navigation. As the court held that the
anchored vessel was in navigation for a period of
approximately two years, such legal precedent may be used in
the future to challenge time limitations which could be
associated with anchoring laws.
In both Bowen and Monstad, the issue central to the case
was whether an anchored vessel was engaged in navigation. in
both cases, the individual courts ruled that anchored vessels
were in fact engaged in navigation. While the cases deal
directly with the question of anchoring as an act of
navigation, other cases, such as Sayer and Kuramo have
indirectly provided opinions on the matter.
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In Sayer, the issue central to the case involved a boat
which was moored at a terminal, rather than anchored. Although
the act of mooring a vessel at a terminal differs
SUbstantially from that of anchoring, the court addressed the
definition of navigation and held it to include anchoring.
Likewise, in Kuramo, although the issue was one of an
individual's attempt to establish exclusive rights over a
parcel of SUbmerged land, the court examined the question of
navigation, and ruled that it includes, as incident, the
anchoring of a vessel.
Research has resulted in the finding of at least four
legal cases which specifically state that a vessel which is
lying at anchor is actively engaged in navigation. Not only do
these cases support the premise that anchoring is an act of
navigation, but they are also indicative of a degree of
consistency in the evaluation of such a question. consistency
in interpreting the definition of navigation to include
anchoring is significant in that it sets a logical path by
which courts have and should continue to define one of the key
elements in the anchoring issue.
While the four previously mentioned cases deal with the
association of anchoring to navigation, two other cases also
discussed in Chapter I, Section B, deal with the expansion of
the term 'navigation'. This expansion includes factors other
than anchoring, but which are still of significance in
understanding the scope of navigation and how the broadened
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scope might affect anchoring laws. These two cases are The
Idaho, and Locke.
In The Idaho, the court expanded the definition of
navigation to include activities incidental to making a
journey. Such activities include taking on passengers and
cargo, stowage of cargo, and the general management of a
vessel. Subsequently, in Locke, the court held that the
definition of navigation can include a period of time, such as
when a vessel is passing through a canal, when the vessel is
sUbject to the actions of people not even aboard the vessel at
such time. These cases signify the expansion of the definition
of navigation, and might prove useful in the resolution of
future issues.
The evidence which has been compiled indicates that
anchoring can be proven to be an act of navigation. This is in
support of the first hypothesis. The fact that vessels which
are at anchor are engaged in navigation is perhaps one of the
most significant findings of the study . Primarily, this is
because the incorporation of anchoring within the definition
of navigation creates the potential for legal interpreters and
policy-makers to expand the jurisdictional authority of the
federal navigation servitude, the SUbmerged Lands Act, and the
pUblic trust doctrine to specifically encompass anchoring. As
all of these legal guides protect the right of free
navigation, and as anchoring is an act of navigation, it
follows that anchoring is implicitly, a federally protected
113
right. This is of importance in analyzing the validity of
state-imposed anchorage laws, and ultimately deciding whether
such laws are constitutional.
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C. Anchoring laws as restrictions on interstate commerce
The importance of maintaining free channels of interstate
commerce has long been recognized by the federal government.
The federal navigation servitude (Chapter II, Section B) gives
the federal government a paramount right to compel the removal
of any obstructions to navigation in order to ensure
unrestricted interstate commerce. This power is derived from
the commerce clause of the Constitution.
The link between interstate commerce and navigation was
established in Gibbons v. ogden,296 where the Supreme Court
defined the nature of interstate commerce as comprehending
navigation. As the definition of navigation has likewise been
shown to comprehend anchoring, it follows that anchoring is
incidental to interstate commerce. In this respect, laws which
restrict anchoring may also restrict interstate commerce. The
constitutionality of anchoring laws may be determined based on
the relationship of such laws with interstate commerce. If
anchoring laws are restrictive of interstate commerce, then
such laws would logically be unconstitutional. If, however,
anchoring laws do not restrict interstate commerce, then such
laws may indeed be justifiable extensions of state authority.
Although the immediate purpose is to determine whether or not
anchoring laws, such as those noted in the test case, serve to
296 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 23 (1824).
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restrict interstate commerce, the broader implications of the
results of such a determination should be kept in mind during
this stage of the analysis.
In the test case (Chapter IV, section C), the District
Court examined some, but not all of Hawaii's statutes which
affect anchoring and navigation. In reviewing the case, the
court admitted that the regulations which were noted (HRS 200-
4 and HRS 200-6), may have created an indirect burden on
interstate commerce. While the court went on to state that
"such regulation is permissible if the state regulates
evenhandedlY",297 it failed to acknowledge other Hawaiian
laws which regulate in an inequitable manner.
One law which was not examined by the court in the test
case is HRS 266-21. This statute establishes guidelines for
higher application fees, mooring fees and liveaboard fees for
non-residents of Hawaii than for residents. Other Hawaiian
statutes, such as HRS 200-6, require that a permit be obtained
in order to legally anchor a vessel in the waters of the
state. As a non-resident is required to pay more for a permit
application than a resident, it is evident that the state is
not regulating in an evenhanded manner. In fact, through the
regulatory scheme, the state has set up a system which
discriminates against non-residents of Hawaii, favoring in-
state interests. This, using the logic of the court, creates
an anomalous situation, constituting an impermissible burden
297 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 76, (1993): 13.
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on interstate commerce. Likewise, it is in support of the
premise that laws which restrict anchoring, such as those
noted in the test case, unnecessarily restrict interstate
commerce.
In the legal opinion of December, 1992 (ChapterIII,
section C), the Coast Guard addressed the question of state
regulation of navigation being limited by the application of
the federal navigation servitude. The Coast Guard noted that
the Supreme Court has invalidated state laws under the
commerce clause when such laws fall into three categories: (a)
laws that arbitrarily or purposefully discriminate against
interstate commerce in favor of in-state interests; (b) laws
which impose incidental burdens on interstate commerce, which
are clearly excessive in comparison to the local benefits; and
(c) laws which serve to undermine the federal need for
uniformity among states in particular areas, such as
interstate transportation and foreign trade. It can be argued
that the Hawaiian regulatory scheme touches upon each one of
these points.
In light of discrimination against interstate commerce in
favor of in-state interests, is the fact that the Hawaiian
statutes treat vessels traveling among the islands as if they
were not engaged in interstate commerce, when in fact such
travel often necessitates passage over international waters.
While such vessels may not have traveled to another state
before re-entering Hawaiian waters, they may still be engaged
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in interstate commerce for the purpose of the law. This is
largely based on the decision handed down in Rentner v.
Village of Burnham,298 (Chapter III, Section C). Here, the
court held that the commerce clause was inapplicable to
vessels operating solely within the waters of a state. Had the
vessels simply left the waters of the state, the commerce
clause would have applied to such vessels.
In one respect, this argument may be countered by noting
the court's decision in Matson Navigation v. Hawaiian Public
utile Comm.. 299 In Matson, the court held that the State of
Hawaii may regulate transportation among the islands, even
though such transportation often involves travel over
international waters. The court reached this decision based on
the premise that if the State of Hawaii was not able to
regulate intrastate travel, it would be placed on unequal
footing with the rest of the states. However, in reference to
the points raised in the Coast Guard opinion, to hold that a
state may extend regulatory authority over transportation
where such transportation takes place over international
boundaries would itself create an anomolous situation and set
Hawaii apart from the rest of the states. This could
potentially serve to undermine the need for uniformity among
states in particular areas, such as interstate transportation
298 Rentner v. Village of Burnham, 82 N.D.III. 1175
(1984).
299 Matson Navigation v. Hawaii Pub. utile Corom., 742
F. Supp. 1468 (1990).
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and foreign trade. Thus, the Hawaiian regulatory scheme
touches upon two of the ways in which the Supreme Court has
invalidated state laws under the commerce clause.
A third link may be drawn by noting the high fees which
are charged by the state to mariners seeking anchoring
permits, moorings, and liveaboard privileges. Under HRS 266-
21, permit application fees are in excess of one-hundred
dollars for non-residents, while liveaboard fees may be over
three times that amount for the same group. This may be
indicative of incidental burdens which are clearly excessive
in comparison to the local benefits. If so, it would
constitute another point under which the Supreme Court has
typically invalidated state laws through the use of the
commerce clause. While the statistical data and economic
indicators necessary to validate this point were not a facet
of the immediate research, an analysis of fees collected by
the state with respect to their local benefits should be
considered as a SUbject which merits further research.
A final restriction on interstate commerce which is
evident in the laws noted in the test case is the seventy-two
hour time limit imposed on vessels within Hawaiian waters. In
Bass River Associates v. Mayor of Bass River300 (Chapter
III, section C), the court concluded that the township could
not prohibit temporary anchoring of vessels within township
300 Bass River Associates v. Mayor of Bass River, 743
F.2d 159 (1984).
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waters, as such anchoring is protected under federal
preemption. However, the court did not establish any
guidelines which would define exactly how long "temporary"
anchoring might be. If the precedent established in Monstad,
where a vessel was still actively engaged in navigation after
being anchored for two years, is applied in the immediate
context, then a seventy-two hour time I imit may further
exacerbate the burden placed on interstate commerce by the
Hawaiian statutes.
In conclusion, evidence indicates that laws which
regulate anchoring, such as those noted in HNWPS v. Hawaii,
unnecessarily restrict interstate commez-ce , This is in support
of the second hypothesis, and necessary in order to draw
conclusions as to the constitutionality of such laws.
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D. Anchoring laws as restrictions of public trust rights
The pUblic trust doctrine (Chapter II, section A) is one
of the oldest roots of modern common law. HistoricallY, pUblic
rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation have been held to
be nearly sacrosanct in pUblic trust areas. In recent times,
the scope of the public trust doctrine has been expanded to
include both recreation and anchoring as additional pUblic
trust rights. Public trust areas include navigable waters of
the united states and the lands underlying those waters up to,
in almost all cases, the mean high tide line. 3 01 In theory,
this makes almost every location that a vessel could
conceivably anchor sUbject to the public trust.
Both the existence of the pUblic trust doctrine as a
facet of constitutional law, and its significance in enabling
the federal government to use powers of preemption over state
legislative acts, were affirmed in Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Illinois (Chapter II, Section A). A major result of
Illinois Central was the legal recognition of pUblic trust
rights to submerged lands. Again, this is important with
regard to anchoring laws, as the entire act of anchoring, from
traveling over navigable waters, to dropping an anchor
301 Most states recognize private property rights only
over lands landward of the mean high tide line.
Massachusetts, however, recognizes private property
interests landward of the low tide line.
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overboard and having it ultimately come to rest on the
submerged lands, is within the purview of public trust rights.
state action and laws which run contrary to the principles of
the public trust doctrine act as a detriment to the public
interest, and have typically been found to be
unconstitutional. This concept should be kept in mind
throughout this stage of the analysis, as it will ultimately
help to answer the question of the constitutional status of
anchoring laws.
within the immediate context, the pUblic trust doctrine
is important in addressing anchoring laws in respect to the
pUblic rights of navigation, anchoring, and recreation.
Laws which affect anchoring implicitly affect the pUblic
right of navigation through the association of anchoring as an
act of navigation. In this respect, laws which place burdens
on anchoring likewise place burdens on the right of free
navigation. Aside from being an act of navigation, anchoring
has also been upheld to be a pUblic trust right. In King v.
Oahu Land and Railway Co. (Chapter II, section A, Subsection
3), the court recognized that pubLd,c trust uses include
navigation, sailing and anchoring, while in Kuramo v. Hamada,
the court held that the right of navigation includes the right
of anchoring. These cases are of major significance to the
test case. Hawaii has a history of both recognizing the pUblic
trust doctrine as a factor in shaping Hawaiian law, and
incorporating anchoring within the realm of pUblic trust
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rights. Any attempt by the state to restrict these rights
represents a significant departure from historic practice.
The existence of recreation as a public trust right has
been affirmed in numerous legal cases. In Marks v. Whitney
(Chapter II, section A, Subsection 2), the court included
recreation as a pUblic trust right, while in Orion Corp v.
Washington, the court stated that public trust rights include
navigation, fishing, swimming, waterskiing, and other
recreational purposes. It is almost inconceivable to exclude
sailing and other manifestations of water-bourne travel from
the purview of recreational activities. Indeed, in a state
such as Hawaii, where tourism is a major industry, it is
hardly arguable that the majority of mariners plying the
waters of the state are engaged in some form of recreation.
Hawaiian anchorage laws set up a scheme by which permit
and fee arrangements are established for both recreational and
commercial vessels anchoring within the waters of the state.
seventy-two hour time-limits have also been established, and
a discriminatory fee system between residents and non-
residents has likewise been codified into law. It is evident
that all of these state-sanctioned regUlations impinge upon
and unnecessarily restrict rights associated with the pUblic
trust doctrine.
The imposition of a time-limit on the anchoring of
vessels within navigable waters is akin to placing a limit on
the ammount of time that a bather may use a public beach. Such
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regulation constitutes an intrusion into federally protected
pUblic trust rights. In the test case, neither the court nor
the legislative history behind the Hawaiian statutes indicates
the necessity of imposing a limit on the amount of time that
a vessel may anchor. Thus, the exercise of state police power
in promoting the publ Lc good is not justified in the immediate
context. In this sense, laws which regulate the amount of time
that a vessel may anchor, such as those noted in the test
case, unnecessarily restrict rights associated with the pubLi.c
trust doctrine.
Permit requirements and fee arrangements are another
means by which the statutes enacted by the state of Hawaii
have affected rights associated with the pUblic trust
doctrine. By requiring a permit in order to anchor a vessel,
the state has created a system in which the activity requires
an official sanction in order to be legal. The extension of
state authority and imposition of incidental burdens on a
pUblic right reduces the degree of freedom with which that
right may be enjoyed. Such a burden may be a justifiable
extension of a state I s police power if there is clear evidence
that such a burden is necessary in order to preserve the
pUblic good. As research has not revealed a need for such
regulation, then the requirement of permits in order to anchor
is not justified. Hence, laws which stipulate that permits
must be obtained in order to legally anchor a vessel, impose
an unnecessary restriction on a pUblic right associated with
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the public trust doctrine.
The fee arrangements enacted by the state of Hawaii are
likewise an intrusion on public trust rights. While fees may
typically be charged by state agencies for purposes such as
motor vehicle registration, such fees are permissible, as the
associated activity is more of a privilege than a public trust
right. By implication, fees are intrinsicly exclusive in
nature, as bUdget limitations may not allow an individual to
afford the luxuries which are tied to said fees. Thus, to
impose a fee arrangement as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of
a pUblic right creates a situation in which members of the
pUblic may be excluded from enjoying what would ordinarily be
their right. This undermines the purpose of the public trust
doctrine and runs contrary to state interests in promoting the
pUblic good.
The fee arrangement system in Hawaii is SUbject to
further scrutiny by virtue of the fact that a discriminatory
regime has been established in which non-residents are SUbject
to pay more than residents for the permits which are required
in order to legally anchor a vessel. Case history indicates
that such laws seldom stand up to jUdicial scrutiny. This was
indicated in Matthews (Chapter II, Section A, Subsection 2),
where the court ruled that fee arrangements could not
discriminate in any way between residents and non-residents.
Likewise, in Avon, the New Jersey Supreme Court prohibited
municipalities from charging higher fees to non-residents than
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to residents for the use of city beaches. The conclusion in
both of these cases was reached by examining the relation of
local ordinances to the pUblic trust doctrine. Hence,
statutes, such as those noted in HNWPS v. Hawaii, further
impose unnecessary restrictions on pUblic rights associated
with the public trust doctrine by discriminating between
residents and non-residents.
In conclusion, it is evident that laws such as those
noted in the test case unnecessarily restrict rights
associated with the public trust doctrine. This is in support
of the third hypothesis. Furthermore, in light of prior case
history, it is unlikely that laws which discriminate between
residents and non-residents, such as those enacted by the
state of Hawaii, shall withstand jUdicial scrutiny if argued
as cases involving the pUblic trust doctrine.
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E. The constitutionality of anchoring laws
The remaining question to be answered deals directly with
the question of constitutionality and whether anchoring
regulations are permissible or unconstitutional. As no legal
precedent has been set which would provide a direct answer to
such a question, conclusions must be drawn independent of such
data. The evaluative case study method of research, which has
been employed thus far in reaching conclusions, is especially
important in the immediate instance. This is because it
involves description, explanation and jUdgement of previously
delineated facts. Judgement, in the immediate instance, is
interpretive. Hence, conclusions shall suggest, but not prove
the ultimate outcome of the constitutionality question.
Judgement is reached by examining the association of anchoring
laws to the navigation servitude and the pUblic trust
doctrine, both of which have been shown to be major factors by
which previous constitutionality issues have been resolved.
In section B of this chapter, the premise that laws which
restrict anchoring unnecessarily restrict interstate commerce
was substantially validated. In this respect, state-imposed
anchoring laws are incongruent with the federal navigation
servitude. Supreme court history indicates that where state
law comes into conflict with the federal navigation servitude,
such laws are typically invalidated as being repugnant to the
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constitution. This was made evident in Gibbons v. Ogden
(Chapter II, section B), where a New York state law was held
to undermine the principles set forth in the commerce clause,
and hence deemed unconstitutional. Applying the principles set
forth in Gibbons to the immediate case, it is likely that laws
which restrict anchoring will be judged to be
unconstitutional, as they can be shown to restrict interstate
commerce.
The public trust doctrine is another means by which the
constitutionality of this issue may be jUdged. In Section C of
this chapter, anchoring laws, such as those noted in HNWPS v.
Hawaii, were shown to place unnecessary restrictions on rights
associated with the public trust doctrine. As with the
navigation servitude, when state legislation impinges upon
public trust rights, such legislation has been previously
found to be unconstitutional. This was established in Illinois
Central (Chapter II, section A, Subsection 2), where a state
grant of submerged lands was found to be contrary to state
interest in protecting the public trust, and rights inherent
in that trust. Laws which similarly restrict public trust
rights were likewise found to be unconstitutional in cases
such as Matthews, and Avon. Hence, applying the principles set
forth in these cases to the laws which have been discussed in
the test case, it is likely that such laws will be jUdged as
being unconstitutional, as they can be shown to unnecessarily
restrict rights associated with the pUblic trust doctrine.
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As previously mentioned, the case study method of
research is especially important to this stage of the
analysis. Not only does it allow jUdgement based on the
description and explanation of facts, but it also functions as
a means of examining a specific instance in order to
illuminate a general problem. In this case, HNWPS v. Hawaii is
the specific instance wherein the general problem of state-
imposed laws which restrict anchoring is illuminated. Applying
the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the test case to
the broader national arena, it is evident that any state-
imposed law unnecessarily restricting the right of a mariner
to anchor, serves as an unnecessary restriction of both
interstate commerce and pUblic trust rights. In this respect,
and in support of the final hypothesis, such laws will in all
likelihood be deemed unconstitutional.
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F. Conclusions
In recent history, there has been a trend on the behalf
of both state and federal agencies to gradually extend their
jurisdictional and regulatory powers over waters which are
increasingly further from the shore. As a nation, the United
states has extended its regulatory authority from an original
three-mile territorial sea with an adjacent nine-mile
contiguous zone, to a current twelve-mile territorial sea with
an adjacent one hundred eighty-eight mile exclusive economic
zone. Through legislation such as the Submerged Lands Act, the
individual states have likewise enjoyed an increasingly
broader scope of jurisdictional control over coastal areas. As
there has typically been a tendency for other coastal nations
to follow the precedent in coastal policy set by the united
states, the result is a movement of creeping jurisdiction, and
the ultimate loss of the traditional high seas.
The loss of the traditional high seas as a result of
creeping jurisdiction may be likened to the loss of
traditional rights, such as anchoring, by the enactment of
state laws which are increasingly affecting the purview of
such rights. Similarly, such laws run contrary to the
traditional values delineated through the Constitution, the
cornerstone of American legal policy. If the remaining coastal
states and states bordering navigable waterways enact laws
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similar to those which currently exist in the state of Hawaii,
it is conceivable that traditional rights of navigation, like
the high seas, could be increasingly lost. In this respect, it
is important to monitor the implications of state-imposed laws
affecting navigation, in order to assess their congruency with
existing federal and constitutional policy.
It is evident that state-imposed regulations which
unnecessarily restrict the right of mariners to anchor within
the navigable waters of the United states are not legitimate
extensions of state authority, but rather unconstitutional
restrictions of navigation. As such, the federal government
has the power under the navigation servitude to preempt such
laws. This power is primarily in the hands of the Coast Guard,
but is limited by the imposition of Executive Order #12612
(Chapter III, Section C). The federal government may act to
preempt such laws, but only after the courts have stated that
anchoring is within the purview of the navigation serVitude.
until such time, the only challenge to anchoring laws can come
from individual citizens and public interest groups.
Similarly, anchorage laws may be invalidated through the use
of the public trust doctrine. While there exists a potentially
strong public trust case against such laws, the drawback to a
pUblic trust challenge lies in the nebulous character of the
trust, and the high amount of monetary and professional
resources needed to effectuate such a challenge.
It is the opinion of the researcher that the interests of
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all parties involved would be better served by attempting to
resolve the matter through more interactive channels, such as
through proper coastal zone management. As discussed in
Chapter I, the interests in the coastal zone are both wide and
varied, so that the intrinsic nature of coastal zone
management is to provide some sort of balance in attempting to
meet these needs. The enactment of legislation without taking
into account the often divergent needs which are placed on the
coastal zone often result in conflicts, such as those which
currently exist between boater groups and the state of Hawaii.
Proper coastal zone management may be the most effective means
by which the resolution of these issues can come to fruition.
One example of how the anchoring conflict may be better
resolved through coastal zone management can be seen in the
state of Florida. Here, the coordination of efforts between
state and boater interest groups has resulted in the
establishment of three potential state-wide uniform plans
currently under consideration by state legislators.
Florida's restrictive anchorage policies have been
characterized as stemming from a "patchwork quilt" of
differing laws enacted by different municipalities. 302
Negotiations have resulted in the creation of at least three
potential options in establishing a uniform state-wide policy.
The first option would allow boaters to anchor their vessels
302 Boat/U.S. Reports, "Uniform Anchoring Guidelines
Make Headway", November, 1993: 1
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without restriction for up to fourteen days during any
consecutive three-month period in a particular county. After
the expiration of the fourteen day grace period, the vessel
would have to be moved to a state-designated anchorage which
may be managed by local government. 3 03 Under this option,
local governments would be precluded from adopting a more
restrictive anchorage pOlicy than those allowed by the state.
The second option would allow vessels to be anchored
without restriction except in areas designated as restricted
zones. Restricted zones would be established only for water
quality and/or habitat protection, protection of endangered or
threatened species, ensuring equitable use of waterways by
different users, preventing or minimizing hazards to
navigation, and public health or safety.304 This option
would also preclude local governments from establishing
restricted or prohibited areas, unless first approved by the
state.
The third option would allow vessels to anchor for up to
six months without restrictions in all waterways, except those
mentioned in the second option. Vessels anchored for more than
the six month per year limit would be required to use a
managed anchorage. 3 05
At this point, state officials are leaning towards the
303 Id.
304 Id., at 8.
305 Id.
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second option. 306 This is perhaps the most wise route to
follow, as restrictions on time-limits for the anchorage of
vessels could potentially lead to legal action challenging the
constitutional i ty of such regulations, and the SUbsequent
perpetuation of the anchoring conflict.
306 Id.
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APPENDIX
HAWAII REVISED STATUTE (DRS) 190-4.5: Anchoring, boating, and
mooring in marine life conservation distructs; rules.
(a) The department [DLNR] shall, pursuant to chapter 91, adopt
rules for the regulation of anchoring and mooring in each
marine life conservation district established under this
chapter.
(b) within its jurisdiction over ocean recreational boating
and coastal activities, the department [DLNR] shall adopt
rules pursuant to chapter 91 for the regulation of boating in
each marine life conservation district established under this
chapter.
HRS 200-4: Ocean recreation and coastal area rules.
(a) The chairperson may adopt rules necessary:
(1) To regulate the manner in which all vessels may enter the
ocean waters and navigable streams of the state, and moor,
anchor, or dock at small boat harbors, launching ramps, and
other boating facilities owned or controlled by the state;
(2) To regulate the embarking and disembarking of passengers
at small boat harbors, launching ramps, other boating
facilities, and public beaches;
(3) For the safety of small boat harbors, launching ramps,
and other boating facilities, the vessels anchored or moored
therein;
(4) for the conduct of the pUblic using small boat harbors,
launching ramps and other boating facilities owned or
controlled by the state;
(5) To ' regulate and control recreational and commercial use
of small boat harbors, launching ramps and other boating
facilities owned or controlled by the state and the ocean
waters and navigable streams of the state;
(6) To prevent the discharge or throwing into small boat
harbors, launching ramps, or other boating facilities, ocean
waters and navigable streams, of rUbbish, refuse, garbage or
other substances likely to affect the quality of the water or
that contribute to making the small boat harbors, launching
ramps, other boating facilities, ocean waters, and streams
unsightly, unhealthy, or unclean, or that are liable to fill
up, shoal, or shallow the waters in, near, or affecting small
boat harbors, launching ramps, and other boating facilities
and the ocean waters of the state, and likewise to prevent the
escape of fuel or other oils or substances into the waters in,
near, or affecting small boat harbors, launching ramps, or
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other boating facilities and the ocean waters and navigable
streams of the state from any source point, including, but not
limited to, any vessel or from pipes or storage tanks upon
land. The rules may include:
(A) Requirements for permits and fees for:
(i) The mooring, docking or anchoring of recreational and
commercial vessels at small boat harbors, launching ramps, and
other boating facilities; or
(ii) other uses of these facilities;
(B) Requirements for permits and fees for use of a vessel as
a principal place of habitation while moored at a state small
boat harbor;
(C) Requirements governing:
(i) The transfer of any state commercial, mooring, launching,
or any other type of use or other permit, directly or
indirectly, including, but not limited to, the imposition or
assessment of a business transfer fee upon transfer of
ownership of vessels operating commercially from, within or in
any way related to the state small boat harbors; and
(ii) The use of state small boat harbors, launching ramps, or
other boating facilities belonging to or controlled by the
state, including, but not limited to, the establishment of
minimum amounts of annual gross receipts required to renew a
commercial use permit, and conditions under which a state
commercial, mooring, launching, or any other type of use or
other permit may be terminated, canceled or forfeited; and
(D) Any other rule necessary to implement this chapter
pertaining to small boat harbors, launching ramps, and other
boating facilities belonging to or controlled by the state;
(7) To continue the ocean recreational and coastal area
programs and govern the ocean waters and navigable streams of
the state, and beaches encumbered with easements in favor of
the pubLi,c to help foster and protect public peace and
tranquility and to promote public safety, health and welfare
in or on the ocean waters. The rules may include:
(A) Regulating the anchoring and mooring of vessels,
houseboats, and other contrivances outside of any harbor or
boating facility, including:
(i) The designation of offshore mooring areas;
(ii) The licensing and registration of vessels, houseboats,
and other contrivances: and the issuance of permits for
offshore anchoring and mooring of vessels, houseboats or other
contrivances: and
(iii) The living aboard on such vessels, houseboats or other
contrivances while they are anchored or moored within the
ocean waters or navigable streams of the state.
HRS 200-6: Limitation of private use of ocean waters and
navigable streams.
(a) No person shall erect or place any structure or similar
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object, or sink any type of watercraft or other sizable
object, or abandon any type of watercraft or other sizable
object, either sunk or unsunk, on or within the ocean waters
or navigable streams of the state without a written permit
from the department [DLNR]. The department may require any
person violating this section to remove any structure, similar
object, watercraft, or other sizable object on or within the
ocean waters or navigable streams of the state. If any person
fails to remove the same within the time limit set by the
department, the department may effect the removal and charge
the person with the cost thereof. The department may enforce
compliance with this section by the use of any appropriate
remedy including but not limited to injunction or other
equitable or legal process in the courts of the state.
(b) No person shall anchor, moor, or otherwise place any
vessel, houseboat, or other contrivance on or within the ocean
waters or navigable streams of the state without a permit from
the department. This section shall not apply to :
(1) Vessels owned by the United states;
(2) Vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) Pleasure craft or fishing vessels anchored for a period
of less than 72 hours.
HRS 200-9: Purpose and use of state small boat harbors.
state small boat harbors are constructed, maintained and
operated for the purposes of:
(1) Recreational boating activities,;
(2) Landing of fish; and
(3) Commercial vessel activities.
For the purpose of this section, "recreational boating
activities" means the utilization of watercraft for sports,
hobbies or pleasure, and "commercial vessel activities" means
the utilization of vessels for activities or services provided
on a fee basis. To implement these purposes, only vessels in
good material and operating condition that are regularly
navigated beyond the confines of the small boat harbor, and
which are used for recreational activities, the landing of
fish or commercial vessel activities shall be permitted to
moor, anchor, or berth at such harbour or use any of its
facilities. Vessels used for purposes of recreational boating
which are also the principal habitation of the owners shall
occupy no more than one hundred twenty-nine berths at Ala Wai
boat harbor, and thirty-five berths at Ke'ehi boat harbor,
which is equal to fifteen percent of the total moorage space
Which was available as of July 1, 1976, at the Ala wai and
Ke'ehi boat harbors. Notwithstanding the purposes of small
boat harbors, moorage for commercial vessels and commercial
vessel activities is not permitted in the Ala wai and Ke'ehi
boat harbors.
HRS 266-3: General harbor rules.
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(a) The director or transportation may adopt rules as
necessary to:
(1) regulate the manner in which all vessels may enter and
moor, anchor, or dock in the commercial harbors, ports, and
roadsteads of the state, or move from one dock, wharf, pier,
quay, bulkhead, anchorage, or mooring to another within the
commercial harbors, ports, and roadsteads.
HRS 266-13: Dockage.
All watercraft lying idle alongside any wharf, pier,
bulkhead, quay, or landing belonging to or controlled by the
state, and all watercraft discharging passangers or recieving
passangers or freight while made fast or lying alongside the
same, shall pay to the department of transportation such rates
of dockage as shall be fixed by the department.
All watercraft that receive or discharge freight or
passengers (1) from or upon any wharf, pier, quay, bUlkhead,
or landing by meand of lighters, or otherwise, while lying at
anchor or under steam in any bay, harbor, or roadstead, or
(2) while lying in any slip or dock belonging to or
controlled by the state shall pay such rates of dockage as
shall be fixed by the department. Any watercraft that leaves
any such wharf, pier, bulkhead, quay, landing, slip, dock,
basin, or waters without paying it dockage and other charges,
with the intent to evade the payment thereof; shall be liable
to pay double rates.
HRS 266-21: Liveaboards.
(1) No more than fifteen percent of the respective total
moorage space available at the Ala wai and Ke'ehi boat harbors
shall be designated for liveaboard purposes.
(2) Permit application fees, mooring fees and liveaboard fees
shall be higher for non-residents of the state than for
residents ... and such permit application fee shall be not less
than one hundred dollars for non-residents.
(3) If a vessel is used as a principal habitation, the
permittee shall pay a liveaboard fee in addition to the
moorage fee. The liveaboard fee shall be not less than two
times the moorage fee i~ the permittee is a state resident,
and not less than three times the moorage fee if the permittee
is a non-resident. 307
307 Hawaii Revised statutes, Division 1, Title 12,
subtitle 8, Chapter 190, Section 4.5; Chapter 200, Sections
4, 6, and 9; Chapter 266, Sections 3, 13, and 21: 1993.
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